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38TH CoNmrnss, }

SENATE

1st SC$sion.

Rr-:P. Co~1
{ No 24.

IN THE SEN.A.TE OF _THE UNITED ST.A.TES.
!N THE SENATE OF 'rtIE UNITED STATES, March 1, 1864.
ResolDcd, That 10,000 copies of the report of the Select Committee on Slavery and Freedmen, accompanyiug tho bill "to repeal all laws for the rendition of slaves " with the views
of the minority of the Select Committee upon tho same bill, be printed for tho'use of tho Scnat~.

Mr.

SuMNBR

submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany bill S. No. 141.]

'1.'lie select committee on S/.avery a1ul tke treatment ef Freedmen, to 1clwm 1cerereferred simdry petitions asking for tlte repeal ef tlte Fugitive Slave Act ef 1850,
an<l, also, asking for tlie repeal ef all acts for t'he rendition qf fugitii:r slaves,
'have liad the same under consideration and ask leave to make tl.e followi11g
report:

There arc· two fugitive slave acts which still continue unrepcaled on om·
statute-book. The first, dated as long ago as 1793, was preceded by an official
correspondence, which was supposed to show the necessity for legislation. '.rhe
second, dated in 1850, was introduced by a report from Mr. Butler, of South
Carolina, at that time chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the senate. In
proposing the repeal of all legislation on the subject it seems advisable to
imitate the latter precedent by a report, assigning briefly the reasons which
have governed the committee.
RELATIO'.'J BETWEEN SLAVERY AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE Af'T$.

'These acts may be viewed as part of the system of Slavery, and, therefore,
obnoxious to the judgment which civilization is accumulating against this Barbari&m; or they may be viewed as independent agencies. But it is difficult
to consider them in the latter character alone, for if slavery be 'the offence,
which it cloubtlcss is, then must it infect all the agencies which it employs.
E specially at this moment, when Slavery is recognized, by common consent, as ·
the origin and life of the rebellion, mnst all its agencies be regarded with more
than ordinary reJ)Ugnance.
If, in ·jme of peace, all fugitive slave acts were offensive, as requiring what
humanit,y and religion both condemn, they must be still more offensive at this
moment, when Slavery, in whose behalf they were made, has risen in arms
against the national government. It is bad enough to tlu·ust an escapecl slave
back into bondage at any time. It is nbsurd to thrust him back at a moment
when Slavery is rallying all its forces for the conflict which it has madly challcngetl. But the crime of such a transaction is not diminished by its absurdity.
A slave, with courage and address to escape from his master, l1as the qualities
needed for a soldier of freedom ; but existing statutes require his arrest and
sentence to bondag-e.
In annulling these statutes' Congress simply wit.hd.raws an irrational support
from Slavery. It does nothing a"'ainst Slavery, but it merely refuses to
do anything for it. In this respect the present proposition differs from all pre-
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ceding mensures of abolition, as a refnsul to help an offender on the highway
differs from an attempt to take his life.
And yet it cannot be doubted that the withdrawal of this congreesional support would contribute e/T'ectively to the aboliLion of Slavery; not tlrnt, at this
p1-esent moment, this congressional support is of any con~iderable vnlue, but
becanse its withdrawal would be an encouragement to that universal public
opinion whicl1 must soon sweep this Barbm·igm from our country. It is one of
the fdicities of our present po:<itiou that, by repealing all acts for tl1e restitution
of shwes, we m:ty hasten the happy day of freedom and of peace.
R egarding this question in its association with the broader question of universal emancipation, we find that e\'cry sentiment, or renson, or nrgument for tho
latter pleads for the repeal of tl1esc obnoxious statutes, but that the difficulties
which are supposed to brset emancipation do not touch the proposrd repeal, so
that we might well in~ist upon the latter, even if we hesitated with regard to
tho former. But the committee find a new motive to tho rceommenclation which
they now make, when they ser how important its adoption must be in securing
the extinction of Slavery.
Bnt it is not enough to consider the proposed measure in its relations to emancipation. Even if Congress be not ready to make an end of Slavery, it cannot
hesitate to make an end of all fugith·e sla\'e acts. Against the latter thero
are cumulative argumeuts of eon~titntional law and of dnty, beyond any which
can be arrayed against Slavery itself. A man may even support Slavery and
yet reject the fugitive sla\'e acts.
·
TllK FUGITIVE CLAUSE IN THE COXSTITUTION ANO THE RULES FOR ITS INTERPRETATION.

These acts profess to bo founded upon certain words of tl10 Constitution. On
this acco1111t it i1:1 important to consider thei;e words with a certain degree of
ciu·o. They are as follows :
"Ko perwn Jwld to sen•icc or labor in one State, under the laws tl1crcof,
escaping into another, sh,111, in consequence of any law or regulation therein,
be discharged from such service or labor, but slwll be delitiered 1tp on r:laim ef
the 71arty lo whom sue/1, service or labor may be due."-(Article IV,§ 2.)
J olm Quincy Admns hns already remarked that in this much debated clan~c
the laws of grammar arc violated in order to assert the claim of property in man,
for the word::; "uo person" are the noun with which the words "slwll bed~livered up" are the ngrceing verb, and thus the grammatical inteq rctation
actually forbids tl1e renclitio11. It is 011 this jumble nnd muddle of words that
a superstructure of wrong has been built. Ev('n bad grammar may be disrei;arclcd, especially iu behalf of lmman rights; but it is worthy of remark that,
in this clause of the Constitution, an outrage on human rights was begun by an
outrage on lnnguage.
But, assuming that this clause is not invalidated by its bacl gl'ammar,
it is often iusist<:cl, and here the committee concur, that, according to tho
best rules of interpretation, it cannot be cont<iclercd as applicable to fugitive
slaves; since, wlintever may l1avc been tl1e intention of its authors. no such
words were employed as describe fugitive slaves and nobody else. ltis obvious that this clause, on its face, is applic:ible to apprentice:', and it is
known historically that under it apprentices have been dclh·ercc1 up on the
claim of the party to whom "tl1cir sc1Ticc or labor" was due. It is, therefore,
only by going behind its primary signification, and by supplying a secondary
signification, that this cl1tusc c1m be considered as applicable to fugitive slaves.
On any common occasi<m, not involving a question of human right~, such
secondary i;ignification might be supplied by intendment; but it cannot be sup•
plied to limit or deny human rights, especially to defeat liberty, without a
violation of fundamental rules wLicb constitute the glory of the law.
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This principle is common to every system of civilized jnriepl'Udenee; but it
has been nowhere expressed with more force than iu the maxims of the commou
law and the decisions of its courts. It entered into the remarkable itrgumcnt
of Granville Sharp, which preceded the judgment extorted from Lord .Mansfield, and led him to exclaim, in words strictly applicable to the Constitution of
the United States, "neither the word sla.rc '.)l' anything that can justify the enslaving of other~ can be found in the llritish constitution, God be praised!"(1-Ioarc's Life ef Sharp, vol. 1, p. 68, chap. 1.) It ent!'red into the judgment
pronounced at last by Lord Mansfield, under the benevolent pressure of Granville S harp, in the renowned Somer,rctt case, where this great magistrate decided
that Slavery could not exist in England. H is words on that occasion cannot be
too often quoted as an illustration of the trne rule of interpretation. "The stnte
of Slavery," he said, "is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law. It i8 so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law."-(Howell's
State 'Trials, vol. 20, p. 82.) Of course, therefore, the authority for Sla,·cry
cannot be derived from any words of doubtful signification. Such words are
not "positive." And clearly, by !.he same rul e, if the words arc susceptible ef

two dijjerent significations, that must be adopted wldch is hostile to Slai·ery.

But the same principle was also rccognizrd by Chief Justice Marshall in our
own Supreme Court, when ho said, "wlu:re rigllfs arr. in.fringed *
the legislative intention must be <'Xprcssecl with irresi.,tible clearness to indnce a
court of justice to suppose a desig11 to effect such objeets."- (2 Cranclt's Rep.,
390.) Obviously in a clause which is capable of two meanings t here can be no
such "irresistible clearness" as would ju,;tify an infringement of human rights.
But Lord :;\fanl,fir:ld and Chief Justice :;\far5hall were simply giving a practical application to these ven<>rable maximH, which are cherished in America as in
England. It is not necessary to repeat them now at l<>ngth. They are substantially embodied in the word3, Angliro jura in omni casu lib<:rtati dant fa1u;,re111,-the laws of England, in every case, ~how favor to liberty; and also, in the
words of Fortescue, lmpim et crudelis judicandus e-St qui Libertati nonfavet-he
is to be adjudged impious llnd cruel who does not favor liberty. By such lessons all who admi nister j ustice have been warned for centuries against any sacrifice of human rights. BYen Blackstone, whose prrsonal sympathies were with
power, was led to declare in most suggestive words worthy of a commentator
on English law, that "the law is always ready to catch at anything in favor of
libcrty."-(2 Black. Com., 91.) .And Hallam, whose instincts were always for
freedom, has ndopted and vindicated this rule of interpretation as a pole-star of
constitional liberty. " I t was," says this great author, "by dwelling on all authorities in favor of liberty, and by set,ting aside tlwsc wliiclt were against it,
that om· ancestors overthrew t he claims of unfounded prerogative." - ( Constihttional IIistory ef England, vol 3, p. 380.) Nor can it be doubted that this conduct helped to build in England those safeguards of freedom which have been
an example to mankind.
B ut this rule bas never received a plainer illustration than in the writings of
Dr. " 1 ehster, the eminent lexicographer of our own country . In a tract, which
bears elate 1795, long before the hciits engendered oy the fugitive slave act, he
ui:ed language which, if applied to our Uonstitutiou, mu1<t defont every interpretation favorable to Slavery. "Where ther<' are two con~tructions," he says, "the
one favorable aucl the other odious, tlwt wliiclt is odiou-S 1·s alway, to be rejected."- ( Webster's Tracts, p. l 5.) 'fhis principle thus @ententiously expressed by the .American lexicogrnpher may be found, also, in the judgments
of courts a ncl tbe writings of civilians without number. lt is one of the common -places of interpretation. Lord Coke tells us that "wliere words 111.ay liave
a double intendment, and the oue standeth with lnw and right, and t he other is
wrongful and against la w, the intendment wh ich staudeth with law shall be
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takcn. -(Coke Litt., 42 a.) And Vattel says that "we should particularly regard tl1e famous distinction of thiugsfa1•orable and things odious," and then he
assumes that "we must consider ils odious everything that, in its own nature•,
is rather hurtful than of use to the human race"-( Vattel L aw of Nations
B. 2, cl1. 17, p. 300.) But the clause of thA Constitution, which has been made
the apology of the }"ugitive Slave act, is cll'arly open to "two const,rnctions,"
according to the language of Dr. W cbster, or a "double intendment," according to the language of Lord Coke-" tl1e one favorable and tho other odious."
Thus for in our history, under tho malignant influence of Slavery, the odionl'
conRtructiou or intcndment has prevailed.
'.rhere is also another voice which must be heard in cletermining the meaning
of a doubtful clause. It it1 the Preamble which, by 11olcron declaration, on the
threshold proclaims tl1e spirit in which the Constitution was framed, and furnishes a rule of interpretation. " To establish, justice, insure domestic tranquillity.
provide for tho common defense, promote (he general u·elfare, and srcure tlie
ble1sing1 ef liberty to ourselves and our posterity," such are tl10 declarecl objects of the Constitution, which must be k ept present to tlie mind as we reacl its
various provisions. And every word must be so interpreted as best to uphold
tbose objects. 'I'he P1·eamble would be powerless agai:n~tany "positive" sanction
of Slavery by unequivocal words; but, on the otl1cr hand, any attempted sanction of Slavery by words which arc not "po~itivo" ancl unequiYocal, must br
powerless ag:tinst the l.,reamble wbich, in this respect, is in harmony with the
ancient_maxims of the law.
ANALYSI S OF THE WORDS OF THE FUGITIVE CLA USE.

But looking more minutely at tl1e precise words of this clause, we shall
seo how completely it is stampC'd with equivocation from beginning to end.
Every descriptive word it c1mtains is double in its signification. Bnt the clause
may be seen, first, i:n what it cloes not contain; and, secondly, in what it does
contain. It does not contain, the worcl "slave" or "slavery," which singly and
exclusively denotes the idcii of property in man. Had either of these fatal
words been employecl, there would have been no uncertaiuty or duplicity. But
in abandoning these words. all idea of property in man was abandoned also.
Otl1cr words were adopted simply because tliey might mean something else,
and therefore would not render the Constitution "odious" on its face. But the
unquestionable fact that these words might moan something else makes it impossible for tl1em to mean "slave" or "slavery," unless in this behalf we set aside
the most commanding rules of interpretation. It is clear that the authors of
this clause attempted au impossibility. 'I'hey wished to secure Slavery without
p lainly saying so; but such is S lavery that it cannot be secured without plainly
saying so. Naturally and ine,·itably tl1ey failed, ns if they had attempted to
describe black by words which might mean white, or to authorize crime by
words which naturally mean something which is not cl'imc. 'I'he thing could
not be clone. T he attempt to square the circle was not more absurd.
The clause begins with the descriptive words "no person held to srrvice or
labor in one State under the l11,ws thereof." Now a slave is not a" person,"
with the 1·ightsof persons, but a cliatiel or tliing. Such is the received definition
of the slave States, handed down from Aristotle. Ile is not "held to service
or labor," but he is held as property. 'l'he terms employed describe an apprentice but not a slave. And he must be held "under the laws" of a State. llere
again is the case of au apprentice, who is clearly held" under the laws " of a
State. But we have the authority of Mr. Mason of Virginia , for saying that no
proof can be adduced that Slavery in any State" is established by existi11g laws."
( Congressional G!obe, vol. 22 pa.rt 2, p. 1584-3lst Congress, 1st session,)
Aud the person thus described shall not "be discltarged from euch service or
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labor." Clearly an apprentice is discharged, but a slave is manumitted or
emancipated. Aud this undischarged person "shall be delivered up on claim of
the party to whom such service or labor may be du('.." But all these words
imply contract, or at least deht, as in the case of nppreutices. The slnve can
uwe no "senrice or labor" to hi~ master. There i!; nothing in their relations out
of which any such obligation can spring. The whole condition stands on.force
and nothing else. It is robbery tempered by the lash-not merely robbery of
all the fruits of industry, but robbery of wife ancl child. To such a terrible
assumption the language of contract or debt is totally inapplicable. N otbing
can be "due" from a slave to a master, unless it be something of that resistance
to tyrants which is obedience to Goel. It is absurccl to say that "labor or service," in any sense, whether of justice or of law, can be "clue" from him. The
same power which takes wife and child may exact this further sacrifice; but
not because it is "due."
Such is the truth with regard to this much-debated clause. As we bring it
to the to.nch stone of unc1uestioned rulrs of interpretation its odious character
aisappears, and we are astonished that the public mind could have been perverted, with regara to it, for so long a period. Nobody can doubt that this
clause may be interpreted in favor of freedom so as to exclnde all idea of property in mau. But if it may, such is the voice of freedom, it must.
NO LAPSE OF TIME CAN DEFEAT AN INTERPRETA'l'ION IN FAVOR OF LIBERTY.

Against this intcrprctat,ion, so overpowering in reason and authority, it can
be no objection that thus far, Slavery has prevailed. There is no statute of
limitation and no prefcription against the undying claims of liberty. R ejected
or ueglected in one generation they may be revived in another; nor can they
be impaired by any rles~etnde. This objection was impotent to prevent Lord
Mansfield from declaring that Slavery could not exist in Euglaud, although
practically, un<ler a false interpretation of the British constitution, sustained by
the professional opinions of Talbot ancl Yorke, and by the judgment of the
latter on the bencl1, under the name of Lord Hardwicke, African shtves had
been sold in the streets of London, and advertised for sale in the English papers for a period full as long as that wl1ich ha..., witnessed the false interpretation
of our Constitution. But as length of time did not prevail against a true interpretation of the British Constitution, in the case of Somersett, it ought not to
prevail against a trne interpretation of our Constitution now.
There is no chemistry in time to transmute wrong into right. 'fhcrcfore, the
whole question on the Constitution is still open, as on tlrn day of its adoption.
The cases of mis-inter pretation are of no value; at least, they cannot settle the
question against liberty. Such was the noble declaration of Charles James
:Fox, in the Briti~lt Parliament, when, in words strictly applicable to the present
occasion, he i,aid : "Whenever any usage appeared subversive of the Oon~titution, if it luicl lasted for one or two hundred years, it was not a pretedcnt, but a
usurpation."-(Fox's speeclles, vol. 4, p. 131, December 23, 1790.) And s uch
is the character of every instance in which our Constitution has been pcr,erted
to sanction Slavery.
PERVERSIONS WITH REGARD TO ORl(;lJ:>, OF THE FUGITIVE CLAUSE.

But a slight examination will show the perversions which have prevailed, also,
wiLh regard to the origin and history of this clause. Not content with imparting to it a meaning which it cannot bear, the partisans of l;la\'ery have given to
this clause an origin and history which have no fouudation in truth.
It has been common to assert that the clause was intended to remove or counteract some difficulty which had occmred anterior to the Convention. But there
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is no e,idcncc of any such difficulty. Th<'re was no complaint. Not a single
voice was raised iu advance to a~k. any such ~ecurity.
It has also been asserted, with peculiar confidence, 1hat tl1is clause interprnted
as r<'quiring the re11dition of fugitive slaves constituted one of the original
compromises of the Constitutron, without wliich the Union could not have beeu
formed. 'l'his pretension, it will be percch·cd, makes an asse1tt·d stipulation for
the rendition of fugitive ~la,es, one of the comer-stones of the Union. To this
di~crcditable imputation upon the fathers of the republic the Supreme Court
SPemi; to have lent the sanction of its authority when it declared in the famous
P rigg case (16 P etera'a R ep., 6 10) not only "that 1he object of' this clause was
to secure to the slaveholding States the complete right nnd title of ownership in
their slaves as propert,v in every stnte in 1hc U nion into which they might escape;" but that the full recognition of tl1is rigl1t and title "was so essc11tial to
the preservation of their domestic interests and inRtitutions, that it cannot be
doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, witlwul tl;e adoption of wltich
Lite Union could, not !tare been formed." l\lark the way in which tbi~ extraordinary statement is ushered in-" I t cannot be doubted !" But it is doubted,
and more too. Chief Jn~tice 'l'auey, at a later day, pnt forth the statement that
during the R(•Yolution it was an accepted truth that "colored men had no
rights wl1ich white men were bound to re:ipect ;" and this statement was ~aid
to stand on authentic history; but it is now expl oded, and the otl1cr statement
must share the same fate. A careful inquiry will show that it is utterly without
support in the records of the Convention, where the real compromisE>s arc revealed ; nor is there a s ingle pampl1let, speech, article, or published letter of the
time, out of which any such thing can be inferred. Surely, if this provision
had been of such controlling importance, i t would l1avo been noticed at least
in the Federalist when its writers undertake to dcsci·ibe nnd group the powers
of Congress which "provide for the harmony ancl proper intercourse among the
Statcij ;" but the F ederalist is entirely silent with regard to it. Anc1 yet we arc
graYely told "it cannot be doubled" that this provision "conslitnted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been
formed." 'l'hc frequent repetition of this assertion has caused a common belief
that it was hi~tory instead of fable.
But the actual comJ)romiscs of the Constitution arc well known. They were
tLrcc in number. O ne established the equality of all the Statc,s in the Union
by securing an equal representation in the Senate for the small States and large
State~. Another allowccl rcpre~cntatives to the slave States according to the
whole number of free pt•rsons and "three-fifths of all other pcroons," in cousidcratiou thnt direct taxes should be ,tpportioned in the same way. Another
was the bargain by which the slave trade was tolerated· for twenty years, in
conijideration of commercial concessions to the "Ea-stern members." Such are
the actual compromises of the Constitution, with regard to~ '4hicl1 there is evidence. But imagination or falscliood is the ouly author1tf for adding the rendition of fugitive slaves to this l ist.
THE TRUg ORIOIN OF TUE FUGITIVE CL AUSE.

The debates of the Convention attest beyond question the little intere~t in
this clause at the time. In all the general propositions or plans succci!sively
brought forward from the meeting of the Convention ou the 25th }fay, 1787, there
was no alhtijion to fugitive slaves ; nor was there any allusion to them, even in
debate, till as htte as the 28th .August, when, as the Convention was drawing to
a clo11e, they were incidentally mentioned in a discussion on another subj<>ct.
The question was on the article providing for the privileges of citizens in different Statrs. H ere is the authentic report by M:r. Madi,ion of what was said :
"General (CharlC/1 Cotesworth) Pinckney was not sati:;fied with it. Ile
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seemed to wisli some provision should he included in favor if property in
slaves."-Maclison Papers, p. 1447.
But he made no proposition. Mark the modesty of tbe suggestion. Here was
no offer of comproroi$c-not even a complaint, much less a suggestion of cornerstone. The next article under discussion provided for the surrender of fugitives
from justice. l\fr. Butler and Mr. Charles Pinckney, botl1 from South Carolina,
now moved openly, but without any offer of compromise, to require "fugitive
slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals." But the very boldness
of the propo~itiou drew attcution and aroused opposition
l\fr. ·wilson, of Pennsylvania, afterwards the eminent judge and lecturer on
law, promptly remarked: "This would oblige the executive of the State to do
it at the public expense."
Mr. Sherman, of Co11T1ccticnt, followed in apt words, saying that " he saw
no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servnnt
than a horse."
I
Under this proper pressure the offensive proposition was withdrawn. The
article for the surrender of criminals was then adopted. On tho next day,
August 29, Mr. Butler showed that the lovers of liberty had not spoken in
vain. Abandoning tlte idea if any proposition openly requiring tlie surrender
effugitive slaves, he moved an eqMi?Jocal clause substantially like that now
found in the Constitution, which, without debate or opposition of any kind,
was unanimously adopted, or, according to the report of Mr. M:udison, nem. con.
What could not be done directly was attempted indirectly; and the partisans of
Slavery contented themselves, according to the teuchings of old Polonins, with
language which only "by indirection finds direction out." But no '' indirection" can find Slavery out. The language which sanctions such a wrong must
be "direct." 'l'herefore, ut the moment of seeming triuo1ph, the.:.pal'tizans of
Slavery failed.
Such is the indubitable origin of a clause which !utterly has been declared
to be a compromise of the Constitution and a corner-stone of the republic. 'l'hat
a clause for the hunting of slaves was recognized at the time as compromise or
corner-stone, is an absurdity disowried alike by history ancl by reason. '!'bat
the clause was adopted nem. con., with the idea that, according to any received
rules if interpretation, it could authorize the hunting of slaYes, it is difficult to
believe. 'fhe very statement that it was adopted nem. con. shows that it must
have been regarded, according to received rules if interpretation, as having no
"positive" character; for there were emiuent members of the Convention who,
according to their declared opinions, could never have consented to any such proposition, if it had been supposed for a moment to turn the republic which they
were then organizing into a mighty slave-hunter. There sat Gouverneur 'Monis,
who only a short time before exclaimed, in the Convention: "He ne1;er wo,dd
concur in ?tplwlil,ing domestic Slavery. It was a uefarions institution. It was the
curse of H eaven on•the State where it pn.,vailed." There sat Oliver Ellsworth,
afterwards Chief Justice, who said, in words which strike at all support of Slavery
by the national government : "The morality or wisdom of Slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves." There sat Elbridge Gerry, afterwards
Vice-President, who openly declared that" we had nothing to do with tbe conduct of the States as to Slavery; b1tt we ougltt to be cctreful not to give a11y
sanction to it." There sat Roger Sherman, who avowed that he was "opposed
to any tax on slaves imported, as making the matter worse, because it implied
tltey were property." And, greatest of all, there sat Benj amin Franklin, who
by charncter and conviction, in every fibre of his moral and intellectual being,
was pledged against any sanction of Slavery. "\¥ho can suppose that these
wise and illustrious patriarchs of libtrty all consented, nem. con., not only to
sanction Slavery and to recflgnize property in man, but to put a kennel of bloodhounds into the Constitution, ready to hunt the flying bondman 1 They did no
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such thing; or, if it is iusisted, contrary to recei1;erl, r-ules ef interpretation, that
such must be the significntion of"their language, clearly they did not understand
it so. Doubtless, there were members of the convention who, in their passion
for Slavery, cheered themselves with the delusion that they had adequately
described, in "positive" termi,, the pretension which they hoped to eml.,ody in
the Constitution; but. the legal meaning of this provision must be determined,
not by the passion of such persons, but by the actual l:rnguage employed,
according to received mies of interpretation, from which there is no appeal.
Other rules may be set aside as inapplicable; but the rule which, in IJresence
of any doubtful phrase, any indirect language, or any word capable of a double
~eose, requires that it shall be interpreted in favor ef liberty, is the most commanding of all.
'l'hus, when this clause took its place in the Constitution nem. con., it was
clearly as a cipher. It meant nothing-or at least nothing odious. But this
conclusion becomes still more apparent in the light of two special incidents,
which cannot be forgotten in determining the validity of any claim for Slavery
under equivocal words of the Constitution. 'l'he first is the saying of Mr.
Madison, which he has recorded iu the report of the Convention, that "it was
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea of property in man." Admirable
words, constituting a binding rule of interpretation ! And yet, in the face of
this declaration, it has been insisted that tbe "idea of property in man" is
embodied in the double-faced words of the fugitive clause. But as the words are
susceptible of two meanings, clearly they should be interpreted so as to exclude
what was "wrong." 'l'hc other incident furnishes the same lesson, in a manner
more pointed still. I t appears that, on the 13th of :::eptember, 1787, a fortnight
after the fugitive clause was adopted in its earliest form, and while the conve11;
tion was considering the report of its committee on style, "Ou motion of Mr.
Randolph, the word servitude was struck out, and service unanimously insertedthe former being thought to express the coudition of slaves, and tlte latter free
pl>rsons."-(Madison Papers, September 13.) 'l'hus the word "service" ceases
even to be equivocal, for it was unanimously adopted as expressing "the condition of free persons." And such it would have continued to express always,
if Slavery bad not unhappily triumphed over our government in all its department.<i, executive, lcgi8lative and judicial.
It i.., not doubted tbat at home in the Slave States the fugitive clause was interpreted as applicable to ~liffes and that this asserted license was at times mentioned as a reason for the adoption of the Constitution. Even Mr. Madison,
who had declared in the National Convention "that it was wrong to admit in
the Constitution the idea of property i.n man," argued afterwards in the Virginia Convention that "this clause was expressly inserted to enable owners of
slaves to reclaim them."-(Eliot's Debates, ,·ol. 3, p. 453)-all of which was
doubtless true, but the question still occurs as to the constitutional efficacy of
the clause. Mr. Ireeclell, who was not a member of the National Convention,
undertook in the North Carolina Convention to explain what it had done. He
said that the clause was intended to include slaves, but he added, "the north:
ern delegates, owing to tlteir partirular scrnplcs on the subject of Slavery, did
not choose the word sla1,e to be mentioned."-( Ibid, vol. 4, p. 176)- so that on
the very statement. of this expositor the question naturally arose whether slaves
were rettlly includ\\d. In the South Carolina Convcntiou, General Pinckney,
who in the National Convention bad first dropped the idea of "some provision
in favor of property in slaves," boasted that this had been obtained; but he
added, in suggestive words, "we have made the best terms for the security of
this species of property it was in our power to make. J,Ve would lwve made
better if we could."-(lbid, vol. 4, p. 286.) True enough. 'l'hc slave-masters got all they could. If pos~ible they would have got more. But the question still recurs wetber in this equivocal provision they got anything. In the
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Nationn1
Convention they adopted a clause which was only another illustration
of "Mr. ]'acing-both-ways." At home, in tlleir local conventions, they courageously insisted that it forced only one way. It is au old dramatist who tell:;
us that "there is a moral in a villan out-witting liirnself;" and :Falstaff exclaims,
in familiar words, "see how wit may be made a j ackanapes when it is upon an
ill-employ." Clearly, the wit of the slave-masters was "in ill-employ" when it
sought to foist Slavery into the text of the Constitution, and it is easy to see
that all who engaged in the work were like "the villain out-witting himi,elf."
Whatever they may have thought or boasted the thing was not done.
From this review of the origin of tlie fugitive clause, and the circumstances
which attended its adoption, it is apparnnt that it has been the occasion of
infinite exaggeration and misrepresentatiou. Like a Pagan idol, it has been
worshipped and covered with gifts ; but the prevailing superstition which sustained the imposture has at last disappeared, and we see nothing but a vulgar
image of painted wood.
LEGISLATION FOR THE RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.

From tho clause in the Constitution, the committee pass to a consideration of
the legislation founded upon it. Of course, if the clanse bas been misunderstood,
no legislation can derive any validit,y from it. NotMng can come out ef noth,ing;
aud since there is nothing in the Constitution requiring the rendition of fugitive
slaves by the national government, there cal\ be no authority for any legislation
by Congress on tho subject. Therefore, the argument against the existing
statutes is complete. But, on such an occasion, whcu it is proposed to reverse
an early policy of the government, the committee are unwilling to stop here. It
is importaut that these statutes should be considered in their history and character.
As early as 1793, while Congress was sitting in Phifadelphhi, provisions for
tho surrender of fugitive slaves were fastened upon a bill for the surrender of
fugitives from justice, and tl1e whole was adopted, apparently with very little
consideration. 1'lrns, accidentally, Congress undertook to assume tho odious
power to organize slave-hunting. But the act was scarcely passed before the
conscience of people, not ouly at the north, but even iu Maryland, begiiu to be
aroused against it. Granville Sharp, who, in England, so bravely maintained
our national cause as well as the cause of tl1e slave, addressed a letter to tbe
Maryland "Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and the R elief of
Free Negroes, and others unlawfully detained in bondao-e," in which be set forth
elaborately those binding rules of interpretation, whiS1, according to English
law, require a court to incline always in fa.vor of liberty. 1'his letter purports
to have been published as a pamphlet, by order of the society, and to have been
printed at Baltimore, near the court-house, by D. Graham, L . Yandy, and W.
Patten, in 1793. Iu a brief preface, the Mary land society thus reveal the tria1s
attending the new fugitive slave act:
"Still Slavery exists, and in tltc case ef slaves est:apingfrorn tlieir rnasters,
the friends of universal liberty are often cmbarassed in their conduct by a conflict between their principles and tlte obligations imposed by unwise and perltaps
unconstitutional laws."
Such is a contemporary record of the sensibilities of a slave State on this
occasion ; and let it be mentioned to the honor of Maryland. But it is reasonable to suppose that the sensibilities of States further north were touched ~till
more. Mr. Quincy, whose living memory embraces this e,arly period, tells us
that, when an enforcement of this act was attempted in Boston, the crowd which
t_hrongcd t~1~ _room of the magistrate, quietly and spontaneously, opened a lane
for the fug1t11lvc, who was thus enabled to save himself from Slavery, and also
to save the country from the dishonor of such a sacrifice. Almost at the same
time, in the patriotic State of Vermont, a judge of the supreme court of the State,

10

REPEAL OF FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS.

on application for the surrender of an alleged slave, accompanied by documentary evidence, refused to comply, unless the master 1;ould slww a bill ef sale
from tlle .Almigl1,ty. Such was the popular feeling which this earlier legislation cncounter<>d.
There is authentic evidence that tl1is popular feeling was recogniz<>d by
Prnsidcnt ·washington as a proper guide on an occasion when be wati personally
interested. A slave of Mrs. 1-Vasbingtou had escaped to New Hampshire.
The President, in an autograph letter whicl1 has been produced in the Senate,
addressed to .l\lr. 1i\'bipplc, the collector at Portsmouth, and dated at Philadelphia, November 2S, 1796, after expressing the desire of "her mistress" for the
return of the slave, lays down the following rule of conduct :
" I do 11ot m<>an, however, by this reqeust, that sucl1, violent measures should be
used as would excite a mob or riot, which might bo the case if she has adherents,
or even uneasy sensations in tl;e minds ef well-disposed citizens. Rather than
either of these shonld happen, I would forego her services altogether; and the
example, also, which is of' infinite more importance.

"GEORGE WASHINGTON."

The fugitive never was returned ; but lived to a good old ago- down to a
recent period-a living witn<>ss to tlmt public opinion which made even th.e
milrle~t of fugitive slave acts a dead letter.
At last, in 1850, after the subjeet of Slavery had been agitated in Congress
wit.hout int<>rruption for nearly twenty years, a series of propositions was
adopted, which were solemnly declared to be compromises by which all the
questions concerning Slavery were permanently settled, so as never again to
vex the country- as if any question could be permanently settled except on
the principles of justice. But tho "gruel" was adopted, and among its ingredients "for a charm of powerful trouble" was a new fugitive slave act, first
reported from the Committee on the Judiciary by Mr. Butler, of South Carolina,
but afterwards amended by a substitute from Mr. Mason, of Virginia, so as to
become substantially his measure. It is not necessary now to mention its details. Snffiee it to say that in these, as well as in its general conception, it
was harsh, cruel, and vindictive. Few statutes in all history have been so
utterly inhuman; not excepting even those British statutes for the oppression of
the Irish Catholics, which are pictured by Edmund Bnrke in words strictly
applicable to the monstrosity of our country:
"It is trnly a barbarous system, where all the parts are an outrage on the
laws of humanity and tho rights of nature ; it is a system of elaborate contrivance, as well fitted for the oppression, imprisonment, and degradation of a people
and the debasement of human nature itself, as ever proc<>edcd from the perverted ingenuity of man."
A nd such unquestionnbly was the fugitive slave act of 1850, which is still
allowed to remain on the st.-'ttute book, a blot upon 0111· country and our age.
Where a measure i~ so plainly repugnant to reason and to authority, and on
the face of it has so little foundation in the Constitution, any elaborate argum<>nt
against it seems superfluous, especially at this moment, when Slavery everywhere is y ielding to freedom. T he general conscience condemns the inhuman
statute, aud t his is enough.
But it is important to go further in order to exhibit the extent to which the
country bas been deceived on this subj ect. Therefore, briefly the committee
will call attention to the constitutional objections.
UNCONSTITUTIONA L USURP ATION OF POWER BY CONGRESS.

Forgetting, tl1en, for the moment, the preamble of the Constitution, wl1ich
speaks always for j ustice aud liberty; forgetting abo the venerable maxim o
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the J11w, tl1at "we must incline always in favor of freedom," and also that other
maxim, that "he is impious and cruel who docs not favor freedom ; " rcfu~ing,
according to tho requirement of law, "to catch nt anything in favor of liberty ;"
ancl, in spite of :ill received rules of interpretation, assuming that the worcls of
the fugitive clause a<kquatcly define fugitive s laves, the question then arises,
if thi,, clause thus defiantly ir1tcrpretcd confers any power upon Congress.
Clearly not.
S earch the Constitution and you will find no grant, general or special, conferring upon Congress tho power to legi~lAte with regard to fngitiv?s from s~rvico
or labor. In the catalogue of powers belonging to Congress, this power 1s not
mentioned; nor does it appear in any special grant. There is nothing in the clause
itl'clf; thero is nothing in any other clause applicable to this pretended power.
The whole subject is left to stand on a clause which, whatever may be its meaning otherwise, is obviously on its face only a compact. and not a grant of power.
-4\11d in this respect it differs on its face from other provisions of the Constitution. For instance, Congre~s is exprc~ly empowered "to establi.71, a uniform
rule of naturnlization, and miffonn lau:s 011 tbe subjflct of bankruptcies, tl1,ro11ghout tlw U,iiterl States." Without this grant theso two important subjects would
han• fallen withi n the control of the States, tho nation having no power to
estabfok a uniform rule thereupon. Bnt, instead of the existing compact ou
fugith·e from service or labor, it would have been easy, had any such desire
prcvniled, to add this case to the provision on naturnlization and bankruptcies, and
to empower Congress lo establish a unffonn rule for the surrender effugitives
/rum service or labor tl1roughout tlte l°?iitcd States. 1'hen would CongresH have
l1ad nnquestionable jurisdiction over this subject. But nobody in the Uonvention-not one of the hardic~t partisans of Slavery-presumed to mako this
proposition. llad it bc•en made, it is easy to see that it must have been most
unceremoniously dismis~ed.
'l'he genius of common law, to which our ancestors were devoted, would liave
cried out agninst any snch concession. If we refer to its great master, Lord
Coke, from whose teachings in that day there wns no appeal, wo shall find its
living voico. In tho 'l'hird Iustitntc (p. 189) he thus expresses himself : "It
is holdeu, and so it hath been resolved, that rlivided h11gdoms ttnder se1•eral
kings in. league one with anotltrr, are sanclttarirs for sf'ri:ants or subjects £lying
for safety from one kingdou to another, and upon demand made by them nre
not, by lite laws and liberties ef lr'ingdoms, to be dcliV('red." Unquestionably,
if such "sanctuaries" may be overturned, it can be only in a manner con;;iistent
with the "laws and liberties" of tho Statet< whero the fuo-itive may be found,
and not through the exercise of a domiueering prerogative by Congress.
Whatever may be tl1e real meaning of the clause in othor respects, it
is obvious tliat it is a compact with a proltibition on tho States, conferring 1w
power on. tlie nation. In its natural signification it is a. compact. According to
the examples of other countries, and tho principles of juri~prudence, it is a compact. All arrangements for tbo s urrender of fugitives have been customarily
compacts. Except under the express obligations of treaty, no nation is bound to
surrender fugitives. l!:specially has this been 1he case with fugitives for freedom. In medieval Europe, cities refused to recognize this obligation in favor of
persons even under the same national goYemmcnt. In 1531, wl1ile the Netherlands and Spain were united under Charles V, the supr<.'me council of ::iicchlin
rejected an application from Spain for the surrender of a fugitive slave. By
express compact alone could this be secured. But tl10 provi~ion of the Constitution was borrowed from the ordinance of the Northwestern T erritory, which is
exprc~sly declared to be a "compact;" and this ordinance, finally drawn by
Nathan Dane, of MaRsachuRctts, was a:;ain borrowed, in some of its distincti,·e
features, from the early institutions of l\fossaclrnsetti;,, among which, as far back
as 1613, was a compact of like nature with other New England States. 'l'hus
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this provision is a compact in language, in nature, and in its whole history; as
we have already seen, it is a compact according to the intentions of our fathers
and the genius of our institutions.
There are two instances of compacts in history which will illustrate the
present words. '!.'he first is found in a treaty of peace between Alexander
Comncnus, Greek Emperor of Constantinople, and Oleg, King of Russia, in the
year of thn Christian era 90~, as follows:
.
"If a Russian slave take flight, or even if he is carried away by any oue
under pretence of having been bought, his master shall have the right and power
to pursue him, and lnmtfor and capture liim wherever he shall be found; and
any person who shall oppose the master in the execution of this right sliall be
deemed guilty ef violating tliis treaty, and be puni8hed accordingly."
This compact, made in the unequivocal language of a barbarous age, has long
long since ceased to exist, and uow, in our own day, Russia disdains to own a
slave.
'rhe other instance is the compact between the New England colonies in
1643, being one of the "articles of' confederation between the plantations under
the governmeut of the Uassachusetts, the plantations under the government of
New Plymouth, and the plantations under the government of Connecticut."
Here it is:
"It is also ag1·eed, that if any servant 'run away from his master into any
other of these confederated jurisdictions, that in such case, upon the certificate
of one magistrate in the jurisdiction out of which the said servant fled, or upon
other due proof, the said servant sliall be delivered eitlier to his master or any
other that pursues and brings such certificate or proof."-(Plymouth Colony
Records, vol. 9, p. 6. See, also Ancient Charters of Massachusetts, p. 722.)
Here, by words of agreement, less frank and unequivocal than those of the
earlier time, fugitives are to be delivered up. But this compact, like its Russian
prototype, bas long since ceased to exist.
Unquestionably the fugitive clause of the Constitution, whether applicable to
fugitiV(:' slaves or not, was never intended to confer power upon Congress, but
was simply a compact to receive such interpretation as the States where it was
enforced might choose to adopt.
AU'fHORl'l'IES AGAINST THE POWER OF CONGRESS.

But the committee do not leave this conclusion to rest merely on unanswerable reason. There are authorities on the subject which add to the testimony.
H ere are the words of Chancellor Walworth, of New York, in a judgment
pronounced in 1835, before this subject had become the occasion of political
strife. This testimony of the learned chancellor is the more important, when it
is considered that he bas always acted politically with that democracy which
has been such a support to Slavery:
"I have looked in vain among the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution for any general authority to that body to legislate on this subject. It
certainly is not contained in any express grant of power, and it docs not appear
to be embraced in the general grant of incidental powers contained in the last
clause of the Constitution relative to the power of Congress. The law of the
United States respecting fugitives from justice and fugitive slaves is not a law to
carry into effect any of the powers expressly granted to Congress, or auy other
power vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or
any department or officer thereof."- (Jack vs. Martin, 14 Wendell, 525.)
H ere, also, are the words of Chief Justice Hornblower, of New J er~ey, in a
judgment pronounced in 1836. Having shown that the clause in question confers no power on Congress, he proceeds as follows :
"In short, if the power of legish1tion upon this subject is not given to Congrcsi; in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, it cannot
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then, be found iu that instrument. The la~t clause of tl1c eighth section of
the first article gives to Cougred!! a right to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all tlie po•l'er8 vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof. But the provisions of the second ~ection of the fourth article of the
Constitution covered no graut to, confides no trust and vcsti:1 no powers in, the
government of the United States. 'l'he language of the whole of that section
is to establish certain principles and rules of action by which the contracting
parties arc to be governed in certain specified cases. The stipulations respectmg the ril?hts of citizenship and the delivery of JJcrsons fleeing from justice or
escapiu~ trom bondnge a•·e not grants ef power to the general government, to be
executed by it in dcrogntion of State authority, but they arc in the uatnre of
treaty stipulations, resting for their fulfilment upon the enlightened patriotism
and good faith of the several States."
•
•
"The argument in fa,·or
of congrcss1onal legislation, fonnrlecl on the suggestion that some of the States
might refuse a complinnce with tl1cse constitutional provisio11s, or neglect to pass
laws to carry them into effect, is entitled to no weigltt."-( The Stale YS. Tlte
Sl1eriff ef Burlington, in Hab. Corp.)
.Afterwnrds, in a published lett<'r of 1852, the chief justice Mys:
"Be assured, my d<'lll' sir, my judgment, whatever it may be worth, hns been
for years, nnd now is, iu JJCtfect accordance with yours in relation to the unconstitutioMlity of the fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850."
Other judicial opinions might be adduced; but as they have been given since
the controversy 011 this question bas raged, they would be lcs11 regarded.
But there are other opinions pronounced in the Senate, which, from the characters of tlieir authors, nre entitled to peculiar consideration.
It will bo remembered that i\Ir. Vvebstcr gave his suppo1t to tl10 fugitive
i;lave act of 1850; but, whatever may have been his ,ote, 1:'0 far as his pcnsonal
authority could go, lu cmidcmned tl,is act as uncO?Ulitutional. IIcre is his
opinion, expressed in the famous speech of the 7th March, 1850:
"l have always thought that tho Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the States, or to the States themselves. It says those persons csca_piug
into other States shall be delivered up, and I confess I have always been of the
opinion that that was an injunction upon the States thcmsefres. It is said that
a person escaping into another State, and coming, therefore, within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up. It secmJJ to me that tlw plain import ef
tlte passage is tltat tlte Stateitself,in obedience lo tltc injunctioneftli,e Con,•titution,
,lwlt cause ldm to be delivered up. Tltis is my judgme11t, and I liave always
entertained it, and I entertain it no10."
"I have: always entertained it, and I entertain it now." Such are the emphatic
words by which Mr. Y17ebster declares his judgment of the unconstitutionality
of this act.
But he was not alone. l\fr. 1i!asou. the actual author of the act of Con~ess,
thus exposed its unconstitutionality in the very speech by which he introduced
it.
"In my reading of these clauses of the Constitution for extrnc1ition of fugitives,
of both classes I advance tlte co11fid,,nt opinion that it devolves upou the States
the duly of providing by law both for their capture and delivery.
•
•
*
I say, then, sir, that the true intent of the Constitution was to devoh·c it upon
the States as a federal duty to enforce, by their own laws, within their
respective limits, both these clauses of extradition."-( Co11gressionat G!ohe,
vol. 21, part 1, pp. 234-'5, Jauuury 28th, 1850.)
And ~fr. Butler, of South Carolina, at a later day, !!aid:
"Under the CollStitution each State of itself ought to provide for the rendition
of all fugith·es from lnbor to their masters. Tltis 10a8 certainly tke design
ef tkc <.:011stituli-01i."- (Co11gressional Globe, June 26, 1854.)
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Such nre some of tlw authorities, judicial and political, by wl1ich the power
of Congress over this subject is d~uied. .And yet, in the face of all authority,
and in defiance of reason, Congress assumed this power. I t was done at the
demand of Slavery, and for the protection of S lavery. Of course, such an assmnption of uncle-legated power was a us urpation at the time, and it is a usurpation, still-doubly hateful when it is considered thnt it j ij n. us urpation in the
name of Slavery. It is bard to think that Congress wilt! driven to an unconi!titutioual assumption in such a canse, and that, contrary to sovereign rules of
interpretation, it was constrained to lean to Slavery rather than to freedom.
But the time has come at last when it may recover the a ttitude which belongs
to it under the Constitution.
In advising the repeal of the fugitive slave act, it is cnotwh to show that it
is fou11ded ou a uaurpation by Congress of vower not g ranted by the Constitution. But even admitting the power, a slig ht oxamination will show that it has
been executed in defiance of the Constitution.
'l'he constitlltionnl objections to the fugitive slave act are abunclant. I t is
not too much to say, that in CVl'l'Y section 11.nd at every point it is rc1)Ugnant to
a dmitted principles of constitutional law.
UNCUNSTITUTIONAL DENl,IL OF TRIAL BY JURY.

F oremost among these objections it is proper to put the denial of a trial by
jury to the fugitive, whose liberty is in question. It is well known that Judge
Story, who pronounced the opinion of the 8upremc Com-t affirming the constitutionality of the early fugith•e sla,e act, declared that the necc~sity of a. trial
by jury had not been argued before the court, and tht1t in his opinion this wa:1
still a n ' ' open question."- (Story's L ife a,id Letters, vol. 2, p . 396.) It lrns
never been argued s ince; bnt i t is difficult to say that it is still an " open question."
The battles of freedom arc never lost, and the longer this right has been denied
the more its justice has become apparent, until at last it shines rcilplendent be•
yoncl all contradiction. Even it' there were any doubt of the oblign.tion of
Congress, there can he no doubt of the power. Nobody denies that Congress,
if it legislates on this matte r, may allow a trial by jury. But here again, if it
may, so overwhelming is the claim of justic(', it MUST.
'l'hc text of the Constitution leaves t he case beyond question. And here, on
the thrc:1bold, two necessary incidents of the delivery may be obscn·ed : First,
it rnnsL ho made in the State where tl10 fugitive i,; fo und; and, sccon<lly, it
restor<·1:1 to the claimant his complete control over t he person of the victim, so
that he may be conveyed to any part of the country whC>rc it is pos~ible to hold
a shive, or he may be sold on the way. J?rom these circumstances, it is evident
that the proceedings caunot be regarded, in any just senF.e, as preliminary or
auxiliary to some future formal trial, as in the case of tho surrender of a fugitive fi·om justice, but as complete in themselves, final and conclusive.
It i~ because of the contempt with which, to the shame of onr conntry, uncler
the wachings of Sltwery, men ha,·e thus far regarded the rights of colored perEons, that comts have been willing for a momcut to recognize the constitutional
right to hurl a human being into bondage, without ll. trial by jury. Ilad the
victim~, in point of fnct, been white, i t is easy to see that the rule would have
been different. But it is obvious that, under the Constitution, the rule must be
the s,tme for all, whether black or white.
On the one side is a question of properly; on the other side is the vital question of human freedom in it:1 most transcendent form; not merely freedom for a
day or a year, but for life, and the freedom of generations that shall s ucceed so
long a1:1 $Javery endures. But whether viewed as a question of pro1)erty or a
question of human freedom, tl1c requirement of the Constitution is equally explicit, nnd it becomes more ex1Jlicit a:; we examine it~ hi~tory. It is well known
that at tl.ie close of the national Convention Elbridge Gerry refused to sign tho
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Constitution, becnuse, among other things, it established "a tribunal tci'koul
juries-a star clwmber as to civil caees." i\Ia11y united in this oppo><ition, and
on the recommendation of tlie first Congress an addit'onal i;afeguard was added
in tho following words: "In suits at r;omrnun law, where the value in conll'O·
versy 1,hall exceed twenty dollars, tlte right of trial by jury sltall be preserced."
Words cannot be more positive.
Three conditions, according to this amendment, are necessary. First, there
mnst be "a suit." But the Supreme Court, in tho case of Colwns vs. Virginia,
(6 Wheaton, 407,) have defined a suit to be "tho prosecution of some. claim,
dema11d, or request," tbus affirming that tbe "claim" for a fugiti,e is "a suit."
Secondly, there must be a suit "at common law." But here again the Supremo
Court, in the ease of Parsons vs. Bedford, (3 P eters, 456,) while considering
tliis very clause, has declared that "in a just sense this amendment may well be
construed to embrace all suits which arc not of equity Ol' admiralty juri!>diction,
wluilcrcr may be tlu: peculiar form wlticlt tl1ey may assume lo settle lt-gal riglits;"
and clearly, since the claim for a fugitive is not a suit in equity or adllliralty,
but a suit to settle what arc called "legal rights," it must, of course, be "a
suit at common htw." Tltirdly, tho value in controversy must "exceed twenty
dollars." But here agaiu the Supremo Court in the cai<e of Lee vs. Lee, (8
Peters's R., 44,) on a question as to jurisdiction founded on the "value in controversy," has declared that the freedom of the petitioners, which wus the matter
in di~putc, "was not s1.1sceptible of pecuniary valuation," showing that since
liberty is above price, the claim to a fngiti,c always necessarily presumes that
"the value in contovcrsy exceeds twenty dollars."
Thus, by a series of separate decisions of tho Supremo Court on tlie three
points involved in tlie interpretation of this clause of the Constitution, it is
clear, beyond quc11tion, that the claim to a fugitive i;;, fir;;t, "a suit;" sccou<lly,
"at common law;" thirdly, "where tho Yalue in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars;" so that trial by jury is exerc~sly secured.
But even if the Supremo Court had been silent on this quc~tion, the argument from the old books of the common law would be unanswerable. ,ve are told
that there is nothing new under the sun. Certainly, long before our Constitution tho claim for a fugitive slave was known to the common law. In early
history, and down oven to a late period, the slave in England was g0nerally c,dlct1 a villt1in, tbongh, in the original Latin forms of judicial proceedings, natirus implying Sla,·cry by birth. Of course, then, as now, the slave
sometime,; ventured to escape from his master; but the common hlw supplied
the appropriate remedy. '.rhe claim was proRccuted by n "suit at common·
law," to which, as to every snit at common law, the trial by jury was necessarily attached. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, (,·ol. 2, p. 93,) in words
which mubt have been known to all the lawyers of the convention, said of i,illains: "They could uot lc:wc their lord without his permission; but, if tliey
ran away or were pmloinccl from him, miglll be claimccl anrl rcco1>ered by
action, like beasts or otl1er cattle." llut thid word "action" of itself implies
"a Fuit at common law," with trial by jury.
'l' ho forms of proceeding in such cases are carefully prc~ervecl in thoRe books
which constitute the anthoritntive rrccedents of the common law. There arc
the writ~, countF, pleading~, ancl judgments, all ending in trial by jury. They
'\\ill be found in Fitzherbcn's Xatura Braium, (Yol. 1, p. 76.) 'l'he year
boob anrl books of entries are full of them. Clearly aucl indisputably, in England, where tho common low has its origin, a claim for a fngiti~-e shwe was "a
suit at common hiw," recognized as euch among its old and settled proceedings,
as mud1 ru; a w1 it of replcvin for a hor,;c or a writ of right for land. I t follows,
then, that the requirement of tl10 Constitution, read in the illumination of the common lttw, naturully and necessarily embn1.ces proceedings for the recovery of
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fugitive slaves so far as any suclt are instituted or allowe{l under the Constitution.
.
.Auel this irresistible conclusion lias the support of a senator from South Carolina iu an earlier period of our l1istory, before passion bad obscured reason and
conspiracy against the Union had blott<•d out all loyalty to truth. In reply t,o
a propo~ition, in 1818, to rcf!'r the claim of the master to a judge without a
jury, Mr. Smith, speaking solely in the interests of property, thus expressed
bim;,elf:
"This would give the judge the sol(! power of deciding the right ef property
the master claims in Ms slaves, instead ef trying tl1at rigl1,t by a j,try, as pre.,cribed by the Co,istitution. Ile would be judge of matters of law and matters
of fact-clothed with all the powers of a court. Such a principle is unknown
in your system of jurisprudence. Your Constitution ltasforbi{l it. It preserves
the right of trial by jury in all cases where the value iu controversy exceeds
twenty dollars."-(Annals ef Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sesf.l., vol. 1, p. 232.)
1'bus, in those days, a partisan of slavery, while asserting its divine origin,
and Yindicating the rendition of fugitive slaves, recognized the claim of the master as a, " suit at common law," to be tried by a jury; and this lie insisted was
prc~cribcd by the Constitution. But if this senator could claim a trial by jury
for the protection of his pretC>nded property, with much greater reason might tho
fugitive claim a trial by jury for the protection of his liberty. Surely, now,
when liberty is regaining her lost foothold in the Republic, this protection will
not be denied.
OBJECTIOXS TO TRIAL BY J URY.

To all tl1is array of reason and authority there have been but two attempts
at reply, so far as the committee is informed.
1. The first of these attempts asserts that the rendition of the slave nuder
the act of Congress is a "preliminary" proceeding, iu the nature of extrarllition,
which docs not establi8h any right b!'twecn the parties, but simply hands tho
slave over to the local jurisdiction from which he escaped, and that, therefore,
n·i11l by jury is unueces1mry. But tbis pretension is foundecl on a plain miMpprch c111,ion. lt forgets, in the first place, that by ancient authority a "claim" for a
fugitive sl11ve is unquestionably a "suit at common law," to be determined by a
jury before tlu judgment ef re11ilitio11. And it forget~, in the second place, that
the proceedings are in no respect "preliminary;" that they clo not contemplate any
otl1cr trial between the part:ics, but that they fix absolutely the relations of the
parties, making one of them master 1111d the other slave; that the certificate of
rendition is absolute and unimpeachable by any human tribulllll, so that the
claimant, from the moment of its issue, may n~sert an unqualified ownership over
the fugitive; that, under this certificate, he may proceed at once to demand service and labor, and may enforce his demand by the lash; aud that, instead
of returning the victim to that local jurisdiction from which he is alleged to
have escaped, the claimant may lrnrry him, cliaiued and manaclecl, to some distant
plantation, where the only judge will be an overseer, and the only jury will be
tbc creatures who aid in enforcing a vulgai· power. .And this argument forgets,
also, that this cruel judgment may be inflicted upon a freeman who, pcrh11ps, has
never left his northern home, but whose fate will be fixed beyond appeal by tho
certificate of a commissioner. Surely the simple statement of this case is enough.
But the very word " preliminary" suggests the inquiry, to what 1 Preliminary is not an adjective that supports itself. It requires an adjunct, or an abutment on which to rest. It is the beginning or introduction to some further
proceeding. I t is something incomplete or unfinished. If it be judicial in character, it necessarily contemplates some further judicial proceeding. The judge
who pronounces a preliminary judgment must necessarily have in his mind the
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judgment wl1ich is to follow, and ho must recognize his relation to it. But if
there is no judgmeot to follow; if there is no conte1nplation of any further judicial procccdino-; if the actual proceeding is complete and finished; if it is not the
beginning or i~troduction to any furtl1er proceeding; if there is 11othing on which
the adjective "preliminary" can rest, it seems ab urd to call the proceeding by
this name. It is essentially final, and euch is the unquestio11able character of
the proceeding under the fug itive slovc act. To cnll it "preliminary," and on
this around to attempt an apology for the denial of trial by jury, is only another
illusri·ntion of the devices employed by SlaYcry to bafile the demands of freedom.
But it is still said that there may be another trial iu the State whither the
slaYe is eonveycd. On thi~ a.~sumption i~ has b<•en well remarked, that if, contrnry to the geueral principles of ltiw which attach to the decision of a competent
tribunal a conclusiYe force as to the ~ame right between the same parties, there
could be any trial in t he slave State, it is sufficient to observe that it is aMlli<'r
trial, a11d in no rcspc<"t a.continuation and compl<•tiou of the proceedings before
the commissione1~~- 'l'lic only trial possible would be an original suit brought
fo1· his freedom by the alleged slave agai11st his actual master, wboflOever·be
might bc; for the claimant may have already sold him to another. llut there
can be no legal connexion between the two proc<'eclings. Each is original, and
must be decidl'<l on itA own merits. In the one cal'e the actual claimnnt, whol!Oevcr h e may he, is plllint.ilf, and the slave is defendant; and i11 the other caec,
tl,e sla,•e is plaintilI, and the actual master, who8oe,er he may be, is clcfendant.
.And the first proceeding is preliminary to the other, only as an illegal imprisor1ment is prelimit1nry to a suit for damages. The whole preteuRion i~ lost in its
nbsurdity.
2. 'l'he second attempt at reply to the argument for a trial by j+1ry may be
given in lhe words of the author of the fugitive slavo act himself. Ju the debate which occurred on its J)ilHagc, Mr. Mason thus expressed himself:
"If you pass a law which :1hall reqniro a, trial by jury, not one man in twenty
whose slave ci>capei; will incur ti.le risks or expense of going after tho fugitive.
It propo@es a trial according to all the forms of the court. A trial by jury
,uy;usarilg carries witlt, it a trial qf tlte wltole rigltt, and a trial of the right to
service will be gone into according to all the forms of the court in determining
u pon any other fact. • * • This involves the detention of the fugitive in
the mean time, a detention that is purely i11form11l; and whether the jury shoulcl
or s hould not render a righteous verdict in the end is a matter I will not inquire
into, for it is perfectly immaterial, as the iklay itself would r:ffectually defeat tl1e
riglit qf reclamation."-( Co,lgressional Globe, vol. 22, part 2, p. l 584, 31st Oongress, ht session.)
Thus, in a question of human freedom, the delay incident to a trial by jury
was unblushingly asserted as a sufficient reason for the denial of this right.
On a pretension so repulsive, it is enough to say that its feebleness is exceeded
only by its auclacity.
'l'hc committee, therefore, put aside the attempts at reply, and confidently
rest in the conclusion that the denial of trial by jury to a person claimed as a
slave is a n unquestionable Yiolation of the Constitution.
\JNCO~S'flTUTIONAL

DE L EGATION OF JCOIC'IAI. POWER TO COMMISSIO~El!S,
WHO AltB NOT J UDGES.

Th<:rc is Ftill anotlrnr objection on account of unconstitutionality, wl1ich
may be treated m urc briefly; but it is not less decisive tl1an the two objections
nlrcady considered. I t is founded on the character of the magistrate to whom
is committed tl1e adjudication of the great question of human freedom, than
which none greater is known to the la w.
If it were a q uestion merely of property above twenty dollars; if it were a
Rep. Com. 24- -2
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question of crime, involving imprisonment under the laws of the United States i
especially if it were a question itwolving life, the t rial must be by a judge duly
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and conseHt of the Senate,
holding office during good behEtvior, receiving for bis services a fixed compensation, and bound by a solemn oath of office. But tliio great question of human
freedom is committed to the unaided judgment of a petty magistrate, called a
commissioner, appointed by the court instead of tlie President, holding bis office
during the will of the court instead of during good behavior, paid by fees
according to each individual case, iMtead of receiving for bis services a fixed
compensation, and not bound by any oath of office.
.A claim for the rendition of a fugitive from service or labor, constituting, as
i t docs, "a suit at common law," and also "a case arising under the Constitution," must be determined by a judicial tribunal ; but a commissioner is not a
judicial tribunal, nor is he in any sense a judge, so that he is not entitled under
the Constitntion to exercise this extraordinary jurisdiction.
.As a " suit at common law," the claim must be tried by tl1e tribunal which
has jurisdiction of suits. But a commissioner can have no such jurisdiction.
As " a case arising under the Constitution," it falls uudcr the judicial power
of the United States; but a commissioner is no part of this power.
There are two provisions of the Constitution which place this conclnsion beyond
question. JJ'irst. l3y article III, section 7, it is declared that "tl.ejudicialtower eftl,e
United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establisl1. T he judges, botl1 of
the supreme and the inferior conrts, ehall hold their office during good behavior,
and sha\l at stated times receive for their sen-ices a compensation, which slrnll
not be diminis hed during their continuance in office." Secondly. By article IJI,
section 2, it is declared that "tlte judicial pow£>r sliall extend tn all cases in l«w
and equity under tl;is Constit1ttion, tlw lau·s ef tlw Cnited :States, and the
treaties made, or which slrnll be ruade, under their authority." H ere it appears,
first, who are the judges constituting the judicial power of the United States;
a.nd secondly, what is thr extent of this power. But a commissioner clearly is
llOt ajudge, or any part oftl10jndicial power. Therefore, by inevitable conelusion,
h e cannot have jurisdiction of any "case arising irnder the Oonstitufio11." But
the Supreme Court has expressly decided that the proceeding by a claimant for
t he delivery of an alleged slave "constitutes in the strictest sense a controversy
between the parties, and a ca.~e arisi11g under tlw CoitJtitution of the United
States, with the express delegation of judicial power given by that instrument."
- (Pri{!g's case, 16 P eters, 616.)
And yet a commissioner, dressed in the smallest and briefest antbority, is put
forward to determine this great case under the Constitution, and his jnclgment
is declared to be final, and even without appe11l. The fugitive slave act proclaims
expressly (section 4) tlrn,t "he shall have ermcurrent jurisdiction with the jndges
of the circuit and district courts of the U nitcd States;' '(section 6) tbat"be shall lie;ir
and dete1·rnine the case of the claimant in a summary manuer;" and (section 6) that
"his certificnte shall be conclusive of the right of the person in whose favor
granted to remove snch fugitive to the State or T erritory from which be escaped,
and sliall pre1:ent all molestation ef tlte saicl person by any process issued by
any court, judge, magistrate, or otlter person ulwtsoever." Such are the
p lenary powers conferred upon tl1e commissioner, together with an eminent
jurisdiction concurrent with j udges of the circuit and di~trict courts. This
act, as originally introduced by Mr. Butler, before the substitute of Mr.
:Mason, intru;,tccl this concurrent jurisdiction to the whole army of postmasters ;
bnt a tnunpery commi11~ioner, appointccl by a court, is as little entitled to exercise it as a postmaster. It is not doubted that, under existiug ~tatutes, a commissioner may be appointed to take depositions and acknowledgments of bail,
and also to arrest, examine and detain offenders for trial. Thus much a court

REP.EAL OF FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS.

19
power ef

may authorize; but a court cannot drlegate to a commissioner the
trying a cause, whether "a ~uit at common law" or "a case ad~in6 mulcr the
Constitution;" 1ior cwi Cm,grcss authorize a court to delPgate lltis power. Tho
whole prctensio11 is a discredit to the jurisprudeuco of the country. ·
Such arc three principal oujections to tho constitutionality of thi.3 act. One
alone i3 cuough. The three together are more than enough.
OTHER OUJECTIO~S TO THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT.

Bnt there are other objections to which the committee merely allude.
'l'he offensive act, defying tho whole law of evidence, authorizes a judgment
which shall despoil a man of his liberty on ex parte testimony, by atlidavits,
without the sanction of cross-examination.
It practically denies the w1it of 71.abeas cor])U8, o,·er known as the palladiwn
of the citizen.
Contrary to the declared purpo$eS of the framers of tho Constitution, it sends
the fugitive back "at the public expense."
Adding meanness to the \"iolation of the Constitution, it bribes the commissioner by n double fee to proDounco ngainst freedom. If he dooms a man to
Slavery the reward is ten dollars, but saving him to freedom his dole is five dollars.
A s it is for tlie public weal tlmt there slJOuld be an end of 8uits, so, by the
consent of civilized nations, these mu~t be instituted within fixed limitations of
time; but this act, exalting slavery above even this practical principle of universal ju~ticc, ordains proceedings against freedom without auy reference to
la.1>se of ti me.
Citreless of the feelings and conscic11tious convictions of good men who cannot
help in the work of thrusting a fellow-being back into bondage, tl1is act declare<!
that '' all good citizens are hereby C(lmm:rnded to aicl and assist in the prompt
a11d cfficic11t execution of this law ;" and this injunction is addressed to all alike,
not excepting those who religiously believe that the Divine mandate is as binding now as when it was first given to the llcbrews of old: "Tnou SHAJ.T No1·
D~:LIVEll unto his mastei- tlie senHmt wlticl1, is escaped from ltis mcutt?· unto
thee; he shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place where he shall
choose, iu one of the gates whrrc it likt-th him best; thou shalt not oppress him."(Dcuteronom.11, ch. 23, v('rses 15 nnd 16.) The thunder of l::iinai is silent nud tho
ancient judgments have ceased ; but an act of Congress, which, b~ides it11
direct violntion of this early law, offend,, every sentiment, of Christianity, must
expect tho judgments of men, even if it escapes those of H eaven. Perl1aps tho
sorrows and fuuernls of this war are so many warnings to do justice.
But thi~ act is to be :;cen not merely in its open defiance of the Constitution,
nnd of all the decencies of legislation; it mui<t bo considered, also, in two other
aspects : fir~t, in its cou~equences; and ~ecoudly, iu the character of its authors.
'l'he time at last has come when each of these may be exposed.
COXSEQ\!E:-IC'ES OF TIIE FCOITIVE !:'LA VE ACT.

And, first, as to its consequences. In the history of the African race the~c
can ncnr uc forgotten. Siucc the first authorization of tltc slave trade nothin"
so terrible had fallen upon this unh:tppy people, whether we contemplnte it~
crnclty to iuclividuals or the widespread proscription which it launched a&rtiust
0
all who were "guilty of a ekin not colored as our own."
It is l'nd to know of suffering anywhere, even by a single lowly person.
But our foc>lings arc enhanced when individual sorrows arc multiplied and tho
blow descc>nds upon a whole race. II istory, too, takes up the grief. 'l'ho Jews
expelled from Sp tin by merciless decrees; the H11guenots driven from Franco
by the rcvocatiou of the edict of ~fantcs; our own Puritan fathers compelled to

20

REPEAL OF FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS.

e-xile for rrliginus freedom; all these receive a gushing sympathy, nnd we detest
the tyrants. These were pcrsecutioils for religion in days of religious bigotry
and darknrss. But an American Congress, in this age of Christian light, Mt in
lhe f,inaticism of religion, but in the fanaticism of Sfanry, did an act which
can find compauion!lhip only with these enormities of the past. 'l'he fugitive
slave act carried distress and terror to every per~on of African blood in the free
Statr~. All were fluttered, as the arbitrary edict commenced its swoop over
the fond. 'I'he very rumor that a ~lave huuter was in town so shook the nerves
of a ften~ilh'e freeman, on whom was the ban of color, tl111t he died. 'l'o large
numbers this net was a decrre of instantaneous expulsion from the R epublic,
undr r the penalties of Slavery to tbem and thrir licira forever. Stnng with
despair, 11s many /18 G,000 Christian men and women, meritori.on~ persons-a
larger ban<l thau that of tbe l'Scaping Pui itans-prccipilately fled from homes
which they had established, opportuuiries of usefulness which thry had found,
and the regard of fellow-ci1izens, until at last, in an unwelcome 11orthern climate, benentl1 the Uriti~h flag, with ghul voices of freedom ou their lipi!, though
with the yeamingn of exile in their hearts, they were ha1ipy in swelling the
chant" God save tl1e Queen."
But such an injustice cannot be rC'strained in its influence. Wherever it
sliowa ilsdf it is an cxl<'nsion of Slavery, with all the wrong, Yiolence, and brutality which are tbe natnral outgrowth of Slavery. The free States became
little better than a hngn outlying plantation, quivering under the lash of tl1e
overseer; or rnther they wero a di\"er.:1ified hunting-ground for the flying bondman, resounding always with the "halloo" of the Jnmtsman. 'l'here ileemd to
be no rei!t. The chase was hardly finished at Boston, Lefore it broke ont at
Philadelphia, Syracuse, or Buffalo, and then again raged furiously over the prairies of the we$t. Not a case occurred which did not :shock the conscience of
the country, and sting it with anger. Tho records of the time attest the accnr11cy of this statemrnt. Pcrliaps there is no instance iu hi:story where human
passion showed itself in grander forms of cxpre~sion, or where eloquence lent all
lier gifts more completrly to the demands of liberty, than the speech of an eminent clmrncter now dean and buried in a foreign land, denouncing the capture
of Thomas Simms, at Boston, and irn·oking tho judgment of God and man
upon the agents in this wickedness. 'l'be great, effort cannot be forgotten in
the history of bumanity. Hut every case pleaded with au eloquence of its own,
until, at last, one of those tragedies occurred which darken the ht•:wens and cry
out with a ,oice that will be henrd. ] t was the voice of a mother standing
over her murdered child. M argarct Garner had eecaped from Slavery with three
children, but she was overtaken at Cincinnati. Unwilling to sec her offspring
1·etumed to the shmnblcs of the south, this unhappy person, c1c8cribed in tl1e testimony as "a womanly, amiable, affectionate mother," drtermincd to save them in the
only way within her power. \Vi th a butcher knife, coolly and deliberately, l:!he
took the life of one of the children, drscribed as "almol:'t white, and a little
girl of rare beauty," aud attrmpted, without success, to take the life of the
olhf'r two. 'l'o the preacher wlio interrogated her, she exclaimed: "'l'he child
was my own, given me of God to do the best a mother could in its behalf.
I ha.,·e done the best I cotd<l; I woul<l have done more and better for the rest;
I knew it was better for them to go home to God tlum back to shwery." llut
she wa.s restrained in her purposr. 'l'he fugitive slave act triumphed, aud after
tbe determination of ~undry qnestions of jurisdiction, this devoted historic
mother, with the two children that remained to her, and the cleacl body of the
little one just emancipated, was e1,1cor tcd by a national guard of nrmed men to
the doom of Sla,,ery. But her case did not cud with this rrvolting ~acriliee.
So long tU! the human heart is movrd by human suffering, the story of this
mother will be read with alternate anger and grief, while it is studied as a perpetual witness to tbe slaveholding tyranny which then ruled the R epublic with
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, execrable exactions, destined at hst to break out in war, as tho sacrifice of Virginia by ber father is a perpetual witness to tbe decemviral tyranny wLich rnled
Rome.
But liberty is always priceless. There arc other instances less known in
which kinclred wrong has been done. Bvery case was a tragcdy-nnder the
forms of law. Worse tban poisoned bowl 01· dagger was the certificate of a
commissioner-who was allowed, without intenupt,ion, to continue his drnaclf'ul
trade. Even since the rebellion for Slavery bas been raging in blood, the pretension of returning slaves to their masters has not been abandoned. 'l'he
piety of Abraham, who offered u~ Isaac as a sac1:ifice t?. ,Jehovah, has bee~
imitated, and the country has contumed to offer up its fug1t1ve slaves as a sacnfice to Slavery. It i,; reported, on good authority, that among the sliiv!'s thus
offered up was one who, by his communications to the government, had been
the means of saving upwards of one hundred thousand dollars. And here iu
"\'Vashington, since the beneficent act of emancipation, even in sigl1t of the flag
floating from the national Capitol, the fugitive slave act bas been made a scourge
and a terror to iuuocent men ancl women
If all these pains and sorrows had redounded in an'y respect to the J10nor of
the country, or had contributed in any t·espect to the strength of the Union, thcu
we might confess, perhaps, that something at least had been gained. But, alas !
there has been no thing but unmixed evil. The country has suffered in its good
name, while foreign nations have pointed with scorn to a republic which could
sauction such iude,eencies. Not a case occurred whicli wa:;1 not greedily chronicled in Europe, and circulated there by the enemies of liberal institutions.
Even since the rebellion began, in the name of Slavery, the exis.tcnce of this
odious enactment unrepealed on our statute-book has been quoted abroad to
show that the supporters of the Union are as little deserving of sympathy as
the rebel slavemongers. Bt1t from the enforcement of this enactment the Union
has suffered; for not a slave was thrust back into bondage without weakening
those patriotic sympathies, north and sonth, which are its best support. The
natural irritation of the north as it beheld all the safeguard-, offreeuom overthrown,
and Slavery triumphant in its very streets, was encountered by a sa,,age exultation in the south, which seemed to dance about its victims. Eacl~ instance was
the occasion of new exasperations on both sides. which were skilfully employed
by wicked conspirators "to fire the southern heart."
AUTHORS OF THE FUGITIVE S l,AVE ACT.

Such are some of the consequences of this ill-fated measure. Bnt the duty of
tlte committee cannot be performed without glancing at its authors also. It is
by an easy transition that we pass from one to the othP.r, for the two are in
natural harmony. Each may be read in the light of the other.
.And who were the authors of the fugitive slave act? 'l'he answer may be
general or special.
If general, it mrty be said that its antl1ors were the representatives of Slavery,
constituting that i,ame oligarchy or slave power which has madly plunged this
country into civil war. Some of them even at the time of its enactment were
already engaged in trt>asonable conspiracy against the Union . They thought
little of any pretcnrled interests in property; hut they were occupied with two
controlling ideas : first, how to unite their own people at home; and, secondly,
how to insult and subjugate the free St.ates. The fugitive slave act furnished
a convenient agency for this donble purpose, and was naturally adopted by men
who had lost the power of blushing as w!'ll as the power of feeling.
Unquestionable facts will show how little real occasion there was for this
barbarous enactment. It is now es•ablished by the report of the census of
1860 that tho loss of slaves by escape was trivial. .According to this docu-

,
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mcnt "the whole annual loss to the southern States from this cause bears less
1>roportion to tl1e amount of capital hivolved, than the daily vmiations which,
in ordinary times, occur in the fluctuations of State or government securities in
the city of New York alone."-( Compcmdiurn of Censu.sfor 1860, p. 12.) Such
a statemC'nt is most suggestive. Bnt the official tables furnish confirmatory
dct11ils. From the~e, it 11ppears that during the ytnr ending June 1, 1860, out
of 3,949,557 sla,·es. only 803 were able to escape, being one to about 5,000, or at
tho rate of one-fiftieth of one per cent. 'l'hen, ugniu, out of more than one million
of sl11ves in the border States in 1860, fewer tlian 500 esCllped. Such arc the
untbentic facts. But this is not all. 'l'he slave who had succeeded in escaping,
even when 1·e-cnslaved, was never 11fterwards regarded as good property. All
the work he could do would not compensate for his bad example. Jefferson
Davis, in tho frankness of an address to his constiturnts at borne in Mississippi,
on tl1e 11th July, 1851, said openly that he did not want any fogitive slaves
sent into his State; that "such stock weuld be a curse to the Janel, for "ith the
knowledge tl1cy had gained tl10y would ruin the rest of the slaves, and very
probably give rise to the most dreadful consequences;" and he concluded by
announcing that " ho wotild not have in liis qumters a ncgro brought from the
north on any account whate,er."-(Soutltern Press, August 8, l 51.) And yet,
in the face of thc@c authentic focts, >1howing how few ese11pcd, nnd then in the
face of an instinctive repugnance to allow slaves who had once tasted liberty to
mingle with other slin-es, this atrocious statute was enacted, and its enforcement wns maintained at the point of the bayonet, while Jefferson Davis was
Secretary of War.
'l'hero have been wars of pretext; but l1erc was an act of legi~lation, which,
whenever enforced, was a pelly war, and its origin was a pretext. It was
nothing but a .pretext through which the representatives of Slavery Eought to
enforce a flagitious power. 'l'he pretext was worthy of the legislation, and
both pretext aud lC'gislation were in harmony with the authors, who drew their
moth·es o.f conduct from Slavery, and nothing else. 'l'hc samo spirit which
triumphed in the fugitive ~lave act, on a pretext, hns at last broken forth in
rebellion, on n pretext also, E,~ch was under the pretext of muintaining Slavery,
and each proceeded from the same infJueuce.
Spe:1king, then, in gPncrnl terms, the authors of the fugitive slave act were
tl1e authors of the rebellion. 'l'be one and the other have the same paternity,
as unquestionably they hnve a family likeness.
If, however, we go still furtl1er and seek tbe individual nuthorR of this odious
measure the forerunner of the rebellion, it will be easy to point them out.
'l'he bill was first reported to the Seu11tc by l\Ir. Butler, of South Carolina, so
that in its origin it may be traced directly to the bot-house of nullification, treason and rebellion. But l\Ir. Mason, of Virginia, subsequently moved a substitute, which was adopted and became tl1e existing statute, so that this enormity
stalked into life under the patronage of a senator from Virginia. Public report,
which is entitled to belief, attributes th~ eubstitute to the cunning hand of 1\Ir.
F aulkner, also of Virginia; but ou mo,·ing it in the Senate, )fr. )la-Son made it
liis own, and pressed it with untiring pertinacity, as the Globe amply attests,
until it became the law of the land, so far as such a measure can in any just
sense be "law."
But whether its authors be found in States or individuals, there is about it the
snme smell of rebellion. Proceeding fir,;t from South Carolina, it was adopted
by Virgi1Jia, like the rebellion itself. A senator from Virginia took from South
Carolina the final responl:'ibility-as an aged madman from Virginia asked and
obtained permission to point the first gun at l!'ort Sumter. Nor arc the two
events unlike in character. 'l'he fugitive sla,e net was levelled at the Union
l1nrdly le!s than the batteries at Charleston when they opened upon Fort
Sumter.
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Such arc the authors, general and special, of this ·wickedness. The senator
from South Carolina is dead; but the representatives of Slavery still live, and
so also do the two authors. from Virginia. Thus do the representatives of
Slavery, though now in open rebellion, continno, throngh an unrep<>aled statute,
to insult the loyal States, to degrade the Republic, and to rule the country which
they have tried to ruin. And thus do two audacious rebels-one the pretended
minister of the rebellion at London, and the other an officer in the rebel forcesstill enjoy among us a malignant power, while, with a long arm not yet amputated, they reach even into the streets of \Vashington, and fasten the chains of
he slave.
CONCLUSION.

To all this there is one simple answer, and Congress must make it.
A clause of the Constitntion, contrary to all commanding rules of jurisprudence, has been interpreted to sanction the bunting of slaves; aud the same
clause, thus interpreted, has been declared, contrm·y to all the testimony of history, to have been an original compromise of the Constitution, and a cornerstone of the·Union. On this clause, thus misinterpreted and thus misrepresented,
an act of Congress bas be<>n founded, which, even assuming that the clause is
strictly applicable to fogitive slaves, is many times unconstitutional, but especially
in three several particulars: (1,) as a usurpation by Congres of powers not
granted by the Constitution; t2,) as a denial of trial by jury in a case of personal liberty, and a suit at common law; and, (3,) as a concession of the case of
}Jer8onal liberty to the unaided judgment of a single petty magistrate, without
any oath of office, constituting no part of the judicial power; appoiDted not by the
Preeident with the consent of the Senate, but by thn court; holding his office, not
during good behavior, but merely during the will of the court; and receiving,
not a regular salary, but fees according to each iucliv;dual case. But even if this
act were strictly constitutional in all respects, yet, regarding it in its terrible
consequences, and in its rebel authors, it is none the less offensive; for, from
the beginning, it was a scourge to the African race, and a grievance to the whole
country-a scaDdal abroad and a dead-weight upon the Union at home, while it
was the arch contrivance of men who, at the time, were rebel at heart, ll,nd are now
in open rebellion- devised as an insult to the free States, and as a badge of subjugation. Such a statute, thus utterly unconstitutional in every respect, and
utterly mischievous in all its consequences and influences, while it is peculiarly
obnoxious in its well-known authors, ought to be repealed without delay. If
consistent with parliamentary usage, it ought to be torn from the volumes of the
law, so that there should be no record of such au abuse and such a shame.
Unhappily, the statute must always remain in the pages of our history. But
every day of delay in its repeal is hurtful to the national cause, and to the
national name. Would you put down the rebellion 1 Would you upl10ld our
fame abroad 1 Would you save the Constitution from outrage 1 Would you
extinguish Slavery? Above all, would you follow the Constitution, and establish j ustice1 Then repeal this statute at once.
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MINORITY REPORT.
MARCH

Views

1, 1864.

ef the minority, 3ufimitted by

JYir. Buclwlew, and ordered to be printed
witlt tlte report ef tl1e committee:

The undersigned, a minority of the Committee on "Slavery and the Treatment of Freedmen," to which committee were referred sundry petitions for the
repeal of all existing laws of the United States for the 1·endition of fugitive
slaves, have found themselves unable to agree with·the majority of the committee in the views expressed by them in their proposed report to the Senate,
or to concur with the majority in reporting a bill in accordance with the prayer
of the petitioners.
The majority of the committee declare the acts of Congress of 1793 and 1850,
in aid of the reclamation of fugitives from service and labor, to be unconstitutional and inexpedient, and their report is a resume of the arguments which
heretofore have been_ made against such cong1·essional legislation. It is, therefore, a proper occasion for restating the grounds upon which Congress proceeded
upon former occasions in making provision by law for tl1e reclamation of fugitives from labor, and to refute and repel once more tl1e impassioned and unjust
objections by which that action of Congress has been assailed.
'l'he fourth article of the Constitution contains seven miscellaneous provisions,
the third and fomth of which, contained in the second section, are as follows:
''A person chargecl in any State with treason, felony or other crime, who
shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the
executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State l1aving jurisdiction of the crime."
"No person held to servfoe or labor in one State under the laws tl1ereof,
escaping into anotlier, shall, in consequence t>f any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service or labor, but slrnll be delivered up on claim of
the party to whom such sen-ice or labor may be due."
'fhese clauses may be described as in the nature of clauses of extraditfon,
and if they appeared in a treaty between States perfectly independent of each
other, and without a common agent or authority for the determination of questions between them, would be executed e::s:clusively by the political authority of
the State where the fugitive froJU justice or labor should be found. '!'hey would
be only articles of compact or agreement between independent parties, the
execution of which would be a question of good faith in the party upon whom
the obligation would rest. .A.ud the remedy for a breacl1 of the obligation would
be by the action of the State aggrieved, in a resort to war, repritial, or other
means of redress known to international law.
J3ut our States are not wholly independent of each other. 'l'bey are associated together in a constitutional union, and have a joint representative or agent
in the government of the United States. And the instrument by which that
association is created, and that government established, cannot be. rescinded or
changed. except by the formal action of the political bodies wbieh formed it,
acting in the manner prescribed in the instrument itself. In fact, so intimate is
the association, tliat it loses the character of an alliance or league of independent
States (dependent upon the free assent of the parties for its continuance) as to
all subjects, whether of power or duty, embraced in the agreement of union.
'l'he several States, and the people of each, are bound by the action of the common government upon all subjects committed to its jurisdiction.
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And as to the stipulations above mentioned, which relate to tl10 return of
fugitives from one State to anotl1er, it must bo manifest that the relation of tho
States would be different if they were wholly inclepPndeut of p;1eh otlwr.
Doubtless the duty of executi11g the stipulation would be the 8amc, but its
obligation would be imperfect, or at lca~t, its snnction wnuld be different.
If there be no jurisdiction in tho government of the United States over this
subject of the return of fugitives, it is manifest that there i~ no eanction or
power whatsoever for tho enforcement of tbo right of reclamation against a
acf,rnlting State-against a State which declines to execute, or opposrd tl1e execution of tho Constitution, and we would arrive at the ab~urd or improbable
couclu~ion that a rnlemn right and duty were created without any po~!lible remedy for their violation ; for it is manif't>st that a State ng:grieved could 11ot re~ort
to any means of redress knowu to public law. By the tenth section of the first
article it i,i declared thnt "Ko State shall e11tcr into nny treaty, allinncc, or
confederation, or grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor, without the consent of
Congrces, keep troop<'! or ship~-of-war in time of peace, or cuter into any agreement or compnct with another Stnte, or a foreign power, unless actually iuvadcd,
or in snch imminent dauger as will not admit ofdclay."
In ca~e, therefore, of obstruction 0 1· denial of the right of a State under tho
Constitution to have its fugitives returned, it could use no force for tho vindication of the right against a State in default, nor could it even r11ter into any negotiation or form any agreement with rnch State in regard to tho suhject. Tho
consequence would be, that the State upon which the wrong is inflicted would
bo in a worse co11dition as to the vindic-ation of a right against another State,
founded upon a compact of recl:lm:ition, than it would be in if it were :rn independent State, and had never cntC'rcd into the compact of union. F or by that
compact it has surrendered all right au,l power to redress its own injnry.
It follows that a cQn8lruction of the Constitution which would deny to the
federal government all jurisdiction and power over thio eubject of tho reclamation of fugitives must be unreasonable and false. F or we cannot snppose that
those who formed the Constitution intended to declare a right, which ~hould bo
incapa ble of enforcement, or to place a 'tate as to its rights, or the ri,,hts of its
citizens, in a worse position than that in which it would stand as an in<lcpcnd::uit
J>ower. The Con~titution was a remedial instrument as well as oue of order ilnd
union, and it must be construed as creating the powers nece~sary to the enforcement and vindica1ion 9f the rights declared by it. I t is claimed for tho system
of English law, that it announces no legal right without prodding an adequate
remedy, and it would be an odious imputation upon our ancestors to a~scrt tlrnt
they did not make full provision for a like perfection in our laws, in creating
tho Constitution and government of the United States.
'l'his snbjcct of the n'tlu-n of fugitives became highly important in forming an
intimate union of the Stat:P..s, which im·olved the surrender of many poweri! of
independent action by them, and gave to criminals, slaves, bound servauts, and
npprenticcs, iucrc11sed facilities for absconding from one State to another. And
it was adjusted in the clauses already cited, by an emphatic dC'claration of tho
right of rC'clamntion, in the ca~e of criminals upon demand of tl10 executive of
the State from which they have fled, and in the case of" persons held to service
and labor," upon claim of' "the party to whom such service or labor may be
due." And as to the latter clnss of fugitives there is an express provision that
they sl1111l not ho iliscbargcd from service or labor in consequence of any law or
regulation of the State into which they slrnll C8cape. The right of the claimant,
under the laws of his own State, to the service nod labor of the fugi tive, is to
stand intact ancl unaffected at all time~, in tho ne,v jurisdiction to which tho
fugitive has escaped. And "he s hall be delivered up." T o whom is this injunction directed 1 It is general ; it does not svecify any a11thority or pe1 son
by whom the delivery shall be made; and bei11g thus general and unqualified, it
may he held to include any person or official in whose hands, or under whoso
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control, the fugitive may be. Ancl lie is to be dC'livered up on claim, without
anything further; upon an open assertion .by the claimant of his rights. No
judicial procectli11g is suggested, no wnrrant is r equired. ' L'he clause is clear in
indicating a. rigl1t of rcc11rtion by the person to whom the service or labor is
due, and is de8criptive of such right as that described by Blacks tone, in l1is
Commentaries, ( 3 Uom., 4.) Ile says : '' Recaption or rcpri8al is another species
of remedy by the mere act of the party injured. 'I'his happens when any one
has deprived another of his property in goods 01· chattel,, personal, or wrongfnlly
detain11 one's wife, child, or servant; in which case the owner of the goods, and
the hu11band, parent or master, may lawfltl\y claim and retake them, wherever
he happens to find them, so it be not in a. riotous manner, or attended with a
breach of the peace." But it does not follow that this conHtitutional right is independ<'nt of all statute law. 'l.'he regulation of legal rights, though they be
founded in a Constitution, must pertain to the legislative power. A Constitution
cannot treat of details, nor establish the incidents of a right, nor the fonns
through which it shall be as~erted. 'l'he right of rccaption in tl1e mn~tcr exi:sts,
and has al ways existed, in every State possessing servile l11bor; but the exercise
of this right in a free State h; only by virtue of tbc Constitution. ·w ould it not
be very unreasonable to hold that while this righ t is subject to }Pgal regulation
(and it is in fact regul:itecl) in the States from which a fugitive escapes, it shall
be exercised without .i,uy rC'gulation whatsoever in the State to which he has
escaped 1
This right, then, like other right!! created or assertccl by the Constitution,
may give occasion for statute laws, and the inquiry arises, what politic:,!
authority h as jurisdiction over the subject 1 Docs tho government of the
United States possess such power, or docs it pertain to the States 1 By what
bas been already shown. it appears tbnt snch power mn~t reside in the governmeut of the United States, and it can be exercised uniformly, certainly, and
beneficially by it alone. And tlie federal government lrns C'xercised such
power, without serious question. until recently.
In consequence of a qut•stion of the reclamation of a fugitive from justice,
arising between the States of PennEtylvania nnd Yirginin, and a communication
from the former State to President, W asbington, the subject of legislation by
Congress in aid of the reclamation of fugitives came to be considered us early ns
1791. The quest ion was submitted to Congress by the President in that year,
but no final action being then bad, its consideration was resumed at the following ECS~ion. At last, after debate and amendment, a bill entitled ".An act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from their m11.s ters," was
enacted into a law, :February 12, 1793. This act is yet in force, though nmended
in 1850. By the first two sections, fugitives from jus tice in 8tates and
Territories are to be delivered up to the executive of the State or Territory
from which they fled; a11d provision is made for the manner in which it sl1all
be done, and to punish any person concerned in a rescue of the fugitive. 'l'he
third aud fourth sections authorize the claimant of a fugitive from labor in any
State or Territory, by himself, bis agent, or attorney, to arrest the fugitive and
take him before a judge of a "Cnited States court, or before any magistrate of
tbe county, city, or tow11, where the arrest may be m11.<le, and upon prorer
proof to obtain a certificate which shall be a sufficient warrant to remove bim
to the State or Territory from which he fled. .And then follows a pro\'ision for
tbe punishment of any person obstructing tl1e claimant, his agent, or attorney,
in the reclamation. -( Auna ls of Congress, 1791-'93, pages 1914-'15.)
'l.' his act appenrs to have been debated and fully considered in both houses,
passing the Senate without a division, and in the Ilouse of Representatives by
a vote of 48 to 7.
T he act of 1850 was s imply amenclatory of the act of 1793, and it bad become necessary in order to secure to claimants their rights under the Constitution. That portion of the act of 1793 which authorized State magistrates to
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act, had become inoperative, and iu the case of many States, t]1eir assistance in
the execution of the law bad been forbidden by statute. One main object of
the act of 18:i0 was to substitute commissioners appointed under the authority
of the Uuitecl States, in place of tho State officials designated by tl1e act of 1793.
Other provisions of the amenclatory act were drawn wit.h reference to tlie experience of the country in cases of reclamation, ancl were necessary or at least
appropriate to the execution of the constitutional provision. The act was
agreed to in the Senntc upon the question of engrossment by n. vote of 27 to
12, and passecl the House finally on the 12th day of September, 1850, by a
vo re of 109 to 75.
'l'hese arc tbe laws which it is n,nv proposed to repeal, and their repeal will
leave the constitutional right of reclamation without any statute provision
whatever for its vindication.
'l'be mo:'lt important argument urged against these laws by the majority of
the committee is this : That tho duty of returning fugitives is charged upon
the States by the Constitutioo, aud that Congress has no jurisdiction over tho
subject.
But it is not proposed by those w]JO seek a repeal of these laws tl1at the
St.ates shall perform any duty in retnrning fngitives from labor. I n point of
fact they are as much opposed to State action upon this subject as to federal,
and will be found resisting it to the utmost wherever and whenever proposed.
'l'hcrefore, the argument is not made by them in good faith, for tbe purpose of
iudncing an execution of the couRtitutioual provision in question, but for the
purpose of defeating it by preventing the reclamatioo of fugitives at all. The
repeal of tbese laws by Congress is not to be accompanied or followed by State
laws or State action, in aid of the master, but by measures and action of an
exact.ly opposite character. The claimant is to encounter opposition under personal liberty laws of the States and other devices of hostile sentiment, and is to
receive no aid whatever from State officials in tbe vindication of his right. What
is proposed and intended by the advocates of repeal is not a new and more
appropriate remedy for a constitutional right, the substitution of State for federal
action, but tbe defl•at and virtual destruction of the right itself, by withholding
all government aid whatsoever from the claimant in pursuing it.
But the question of the power of Congress to enact fngitive laws has been
most fully determined iu favor of the power, by the appropriate constitutional
tribunal.
In the case of P rigg vs. Tl1e Commonwealth of P ennsylvania, 16 Petei·'s
Reports, p. 543, the Supreme Court decided that "The act of 12th of February,
1793, relative to fugitive slaves is clearly constitutional in all its leading provisions, and, inclecd, with the exception of that part which confers authority upon
State magistrates, is free from reasonable doubt or difficulty." And Judge
:McLean declared in tho same case that "Congress have legislated on the constitutional power, aucl l1ave directed the mode in which it shall be executed. 'l'be
act of 1793 it is admitted covers the whole ground, and that it is constitutional
there seems to be no reason to doubt.'' -(Ib., 669.)
In the case of Ableman vs. Boot!,,, 21 Howard's R eports, p. 526, the Supreme
Court say, speaking of the act of 1850: "In the judgment of this court the act
of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law, is, in all of its provisions,
fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States."
'l'hese decisions would solidly establish the doctdne already maintained by us
upon the question of power, if authority were needed to support it.
'l'he Constitution having declared the right of reclamation of fugitives from
justice and labor, a power is necessarily implied in the government of the United
States for its execution. It is a reasonable and necessary power, resting upon
the express provision declariug the right in question. Aud from the foundation
of the government the power has been exercised without any hostile decision,
from any tribunal or authority entitled to pronounce conclusively upon it; in fact,
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there has been less difference of opinion upon tl1is subject than upon almost :my
other important provision of the Constitution which has been suhjected to debate.
It is true that while the m11jority of the Supreme Court held, upon one occasion, that tl1i5 power was exclusively in the United States, the minority held
that it was a concurrent power, and might be exercised by the States in aid of
the claimant's right, in the absence of Congressional action. But it is quite immaterial which of these views be accepted, so far as our present purpose is concerned. If the power exist in either form in the United States, the right of
Congress to pass proper laws pursuant to it is indisputable; for, by the concluding clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution,
Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be 11ecessary and proper
for canying into execution the foregoing powers, [those enumerated expressly,]
and all otl,er powers vested by tltis Constitution in the governm!'nt ef t/1,e United
States, or in any department or officer thereof."
Raving now stated the case upon the question of power, we proceed to submit some observations upon particular points coutaincd in the report of the
majority, and w ill then state some geuernl considerations which stand opposed
to the repeal of the fugitive acts :
1. T he majority say, in speaking of the delivery of the fugitive, "It restores
to the claimant the complete cont1·0! over the person of the victim, so that he
may be conveyed to any part of the country where it is possible to hold a sbve,
or he may be sold on the way. From these circumstances it is evident that the
proceedings cannot be regarded, in any just sense, as preliminary or auxiliary
to some future formal trial, as in the case of the surrender of a fugitive from
j ustice, but as complete in themselves, final and conclusive."
T he answer to this is furnished by the laws themselves. The act of 1793,
section 3, says : " I t shaH be the dnty of such judge, or magistrate, to give a
certificate to such claimant, his ngent or attorney, which shall he sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labor to the State or Territory from
whiclt lie or slie fled."
'l'be act of 1850 provides, in section 4, tl1at the commissioners wl10 hear fugitive cases "shall g:rant certificates to such claimants upon satisfactory proof
being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or
labor, under the restrictions herein contained, to tlte State or Territory from
wkicli 81/,d1, persons may have escape<l or fled."-(See also section 6.)
These citations constitute a sufficient reply, without more, to the statement of
the majority. T hat statement is obviously unfounded.
2. The majority say : " l t is because of the contempt with whicl1, to the
shame of our country, under the teachings of slavery, men ha\·e thus far regarded the rights of colored per8ons, that courts have been willing for a moment
to recognize the constitutional right to hurl a lmman being into bondflgc without
a trial by jury. Had the victims been, in pomt of fact, white, it is easy to see
that the rule would have been different. But it is obvions that, under the Constitution, the rule must be the same for all, whether Llack or white."
To which we answer: that the laws are not confined to persons of color, that
is, to negrocs and mulattoes, b ut embrace " all persons held to service or labor
under the laws of a State." The majority in another part of their report state
that white apprentices have been returned to their masters under the laws in
question, and doubtlG_ss nnder a j ust construction of them; and by those parts of
these laws which relate to fugitives from justice, white persons merely accuse<l
of crime in the State from which they flee are to be returned upon executive
demand, and without trial in the States where they are found.
3. 'l'he majority say: "As it is for the public weal that tl1ere should be an end
of snits, so, by the consent of civilized nations, these mnst be instituted within
£x.ed limitations of time ; but this act, [of 1850,] exalting slavery above even
this practical principle of universal justice, ordains proceedings agains.t freedom
without any reference to lapse of time."
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To tl1is we answer : that the right of reclamation under the Constitution bein.,.
without limitation of time, it was not within the power of Congress to apply~
clause of limitation to it.
4.. 'l'hc majority say : "Contrary to tlie declared purpose of the framer.~ of
tl1e Constitution, it sends the fugitive back 'a,t the public expense.'" The
allnsion here is to what occurred in the constitutional convention, August 28,
1787, when it was moved to require fngil.ive slaves and servants" to be delivered
up like criminals;" to which l\rr. \ Vi Ison objected, "because it would oblige the
executive of the State to do it at the public expense" -tllllt is, at the expense of
the State. 'l'be form of the proposition was subsequently modified, and tho
objection thus made by one member of the convention has no relation to the act
of 1850, which imposes no expense upon a State. The expenses are borne by
the claimant, or by the U nited States.
5. '!.'he majority further say : "Adding meanness to the violation of the Constitution, it bribes the commissioner, by a double fee, to pronounce agHinst
freedom. If he dooms a man to slavery, the reward is ten dollars; but saving
Lim to freedom, bis dole is five dollars." To this statement it may be answered :
that the pay of the commissioner is simply proportioned to the service performed,
as is usual in rdation to all officers who receive fees. No certificates or other
J>apers are to be issued to claimants when fngitives are discharged, and therefore
the compensation is less. If there were any substance in this small objectiou,
the law would be conected by Congress without hesitation, upon application
made to it.
6. The majority insist at much length, that wl1ere words have a double intendment, or are ambiguous in their meaning, that construction should be given
them which is favorable to liberty, or least odious. We do not propose to impeach the authority of the severai authors who arc cited iu confirmation of this
doctrine, or the doctrine itself. But we are quite unable to perceive what appliC.'ltion it has to the subject before us- the construction of the Constitution ar.<l
the fugitive laws. Negro slaves are persons held to service and labor under the
laws of some of our States, and we are not aware of any words which would
more certainly designate them. I t is true that these words describe apprentices; but because they describe them it does not follow that we are at liberty
to exclude slaves from their application. 'l'hese words, as used in tbe Constitution. have no double inteudment, and are not ambiguous. 'l'hey exactly de~cribe negro slaves, and it does not derogate from their clearness, propriety, or
force tLat tbey describe other persons also. Admitting t bat they are more extensive in meaning than the word slaves, they still contain the siguificatiou of
that term.
Agaiust the conclusion sought to be drawn from verbal criticisms of
the majority, stand opposed the cleclaralions of those who made, and we1:e
cotemporancous with, the making of the Constitution ; the clear language of the
fugitive act of' 1793 and of other statutes; the decisions of courts,of the Unitecl
States, authorized to construe the Constitution; and tlte general understanding
and consent oft.he country, when the Constitution was made and subsequently.
'l'o "bich may be ad<lcd, a.s we think, the clear import, the plain meaning, of the
language itself. Slaves were mentioned in tbe convention in connexion with this
clause, as the majority themselves show, and they were also mentioned in such
connexion in conventions which adopted the Constitution, and yet tho majority
a.ssert tbat the clause does not apply to them because tho language used does
not sufficiently declare the intention. This we conceive to be a rero~rkable
aro-umcnt- that the Constitution is not to be taken in the sense in which it was
m;<le ancl adopted, and, in fact, acted upon and applied by the govemroent of'
the United States, but according to some strained and unnatural iuterpretation,
founded upon slight verbal criticisms made more than half' a century afterwards!
I n this case we do not know which to admire most, the folly of the proposition
or the exuberance of bad faith which it implies.
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7. '\Ve are not impressed by tl10 argument of the majority tliat this proceeding of rccaption, or extradition, i.;i a snit at. common law, and therefore falling
within the constitntioual provu,ion requiring a trial by jury. It is a proceeding
by virtue of a special provision of the Constitution of the United States, and,
inste11d of involving or requiring n suit at law, is the personal assertion of a
claim by mi individual in Lis own right.
J udge ~IcLean says ( 16 P eters, p. 667} "both the Constitution and tl1e act
of 1793 re<1uire the fugitive from lnbor to be delivered up on claim being made
by the party, or his ngeut, to wl1om the service is due. Not that a sniL 11hould
be regularly instituted. The proceeding authorized by tl10 law is summary and
inforUtal." 'l'he objectors to our legislation upon the subject of fugitives would
be tho la;;t men in the world to admit that, in tho absence of the con~tiLutioual
provision in question, a claimant coulcl enforce l1is claim to the pos;;es!'ion of his
se1·vaut in a State to which the sen"aut had fled, because the common law there
existed.
8. 'l'ho majority mention "tlrnt, according to tho census, Jess tbnn 0110 thousand slaves escaped during the year end:ng Juno 1, 1860." ,ve are not iuformed
as to the accuracy of the census upon this subject ; but, assuming its correctness, we have to remark that the number of fugitives who may e~eapo when
the fogitivo acts aro in existence does not measure tho utility of tho laws.
Because tho loss was small, compared to tho whole nnmber of slaves in the
country, it does not follow that these laws were unnecessary or ino1,crative.
Their value docs not consist so much in returning fugith·cs who may c~cape as
in deterring slaves from escaping, and iu deterring white men from asoisting
them to escape. 'l'herofore, it docs not follow from what is stated by the majority tlrnt these laws should be repealed upou the g round of inutility.
9. Tho majority quote declaratious of Oliver Ellsworth, Elbridge Gt•ny, and
Roger Sherman, hos.tile to slavery, and argue therefrom thnt the conl:!titutional
clause relating to pcr~ons escaping from ;;ervice aud labor did not relate to
slaves, because those slate~men, a,; members of the convention, would not have
assented to a provision which included slaves. vVe contcut ourijelvcs with
stating, in reply, that all those <lhstingui~hed men were members of Congress in
1793, a11d wpported the fugiti1•e slace act ef tl1al year!
10. The majority make the extraordinary stutcmcnt, that while )Ir. '\Vebster
supported the fugitive act of 1850, "so far as bis personal authority could go
he condemned it as unconstitutio11al;" and a citation is given to support that
statement, aud citations follow from Judge Butler aud l\lr. l\lason, to show that
they concurred in his opinion. What was ~aid hy )[r. Webster was in substance this, that in his opinion it was a duty of the States lo deliver up fugitives; but there was not the ~lightest intimntion by l1im or the others named,
that the States possc~sed the exdusive power to lcgislute upon tho 1<ubject.
'. rhey held that a duty was imposed upon the l::itates, but they <li<l not de11y the
power of Congress, which is the point in question. i\k Butler, the <·l111inuan
of the Judiciary Committee, in a :-peech delivered in the Senate on the 19th of
April, 1850, insisted that the power was cm1c11rrrnt; and said, "in tho position
I havo taken I stand sustained by Chief J ustico 'l'aney, and tho jm,tice::i alluded
to, [in tho l'rigg cHse,J as well as l,y the 01ii11ious of t ho distinguished gentleman, lately a member of this body, aml now :::iccretary of i::!Late." And again,
after quoting from an opinion of Judge 'l'ancy, maintaining the doctrine of a
concurrent power in the federal and .:State governments upon this subject, he
said, "there is the view of the chief ju~ticc entirely in accordance with the
one uttered the other day by the gentleman lMl'. W ebstel'j lately rcprc•sontiug
J\Iassach118ctts in this body." An illu8tration of ~lr. llntlcr's view is furnished
by the laws of Congress on the :;ubjcct of returning fugiti\·es from jtHice. I t
is the duty of the i::ltatcs to which crirumals flee to return them, but the proceeding for their return is regulatccl by act of Congress.
L et it be remembered that whether the rower in question be concurrent, or
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exist exclosivrly in the United States as l1cld by a mnjorily of the judges of
the Supreme Court, is of no consequrnee in an investigation into tl1e validity of
the fugitive slave Jaws. ,Ye m11y add, that iu case of a concurrent power, so
far as it is exercised by the federal government, State action is precluded. ]!~or
the laws of the United States "are the supreme law of' the land."
. .
.
11. " ' e regret to perceive in the majority report an appeal to prrJt1~1ce, m
tl10 reference made to the autliors of the act of 1850. It is said the bill was
reported to the Sennte by )Ir. Butler, of South Carolina, and the statement is
strictly trne. But :my good reason for now stating thnt fact for public contcmplntiou is not manifest. Senator Butler (now dead) was in 1S50 chnirm:m of
the Judiciary Committee of t he Senate, ancl to that committee properly belonged
the consideration of such a bill. Tliat he should rrport it to tf1e Senate was
both natural and proper. X or docs the fact tbat the bill was an.ended upon
motion of one of the senators from Virgiuia. (~incc cngngecl in revolt,) deserve
the prominence gh-(!n it by the majority. llis subsequent misconduct can give
no odious cbaract<r to the euactme11t in question, u nless we accept a principle
of mere prejudice or antipathy as om· standard of juclgmcnt upon thi,; subject.
Yirginia was a border t:itatc of the soutb; she sought additional securities
agaiust loss and injury in the escnpe of her sluves; her legislature pa~sed resolu1.ions on the subject of reclamation, and it was quite appropriate that one of
hel' seua1ors 1<hould act a prominent part in giving form to the bill.
But if names arc to be mentioned, tbese laws of 1793 and lb50 have a sanction which can be claimed for but few of onr statutes.
That of 1793 haij to it the hand of George 'i\'ashington, and there were given
fnr it in Congress 1he votes of Jti~her Anws, Abraham Baldwin, ,Jonathan ])aytou, William Findley, Elbriclge Gerry, Nathauid Macon, Frederick .A. i)Inlilcnbcrg, 'l'heodorc Sedgwick, and Tbomas Sumpt<•r. 'l'l1e110 arc names from tho
list of yeas in the H ouse. At the same sc!.'~ion, Jobn Langdon, Oliver E llsworth.
Itoger Sherman, Rufus King, Philemon Dickin~on, George Read, Robert )lorri8, and James 1\!onroe, were mrmbcrs of the Senate.
In favor of the act of 1850, there :u-e princely names of the second generntion
of our statesmen- men from the east, the west, and the south- the very latchets
of whose shoes these abolition petitioners before us were not worthy to unloose.
}<'or we were not then left bare and destitute of greatness in the, high places of
power. In that honr of peril and of passion, the republic possessed mc•n of
grMt endowments, of cstabliohcd rrputation and tried patrioti~m, who stood
forward 10 save their country from convulsion, and tl1ey accomplished their purpo~e. Discord retired before them; fanaticism, scenting blood aud carnage in
tlH! distance, was whipped hack buffied to its retiN1ts in the north; southern
revolt wns checked and prevented, and once more the Constitution and the laws
were made to triumph over both secret and open foes. The men who accomplished 1111 this, and at least secured to their country ten additional yems of
peace, ancl growth ancl glory, gave their support to thi:1 law. It cou!ltituted one
of tlrnir measures of acljustmeut, and :it stands open to no just objection on acconut of its origin.
Having now concluded our observations upon the maiority report, we have
to state om· conviction tliat the repeal of the reclamation laws, a~ now proposed,
would be unwise, untimely, and unjusL 'l'hnt the grounds stated by the majority of tbe committee upon wl1ich to place the measure, arc il1sufl'icient, appears
from tbe examination to whicl1 we l1ave subjected them. But further, it is clear
thnt thc·rc arc citizens of the Uniterl State:s, distributed through many Stutes,
who arc eutitlcd to the full au<l comvlt!te enjoyment of a right under the constitutional provision in question. To the enjoyment of that right these acts of
Oougrrss, or other acts similar to tbrm in pul'pose and clmractcr, arc indii-pcn1:'able, ancl their repc-al, without the snbstitntion of otl1er appr6priatc enactments
in their tstcad, would be a denial of Lhe right it~el f, becau~e it would deny what
is necessary to its exertion. '!'here would seem to be some Yague notiou en-
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tertained by the m11jority that this measure is a blow aimed at tbe exiRting rebellion. But such is not its character. It appli~s itself to the exting11ishmcnt
of' remedies valuable at thi~ time only to men who have refu~ed to engage in
revolt, ancl can have no effect in the so-called Confederate States, unless it bo
to in~pirit r('sistancc to our arms. And so far as it offends those who support
tho government of tl1e United States iu this contest, it8 effect will bo directly
injurious to tho public cause.
It was a,;serted by those who organized tho revolt agAinst tl10 United States
that it was the intention of tho nortl1ern States, acting through this government
as well iu1 at home, to preveut all execution of the constitutional provi~iou for
returning fugitives. ls it expedient that we make gooc1 this assenion, or give
to it a coloring of truth, by enacting thii< proposed measure of r<>peaH
.Besides, it may be well worth some inquiry whether it is good policy to e ncourage, invite, or even allow, tho migration of nf'grocs nortl1wnrd, from t'hosc
parts of the country where they are most suitably plact--d, and ~ubject them to
collision with a superior race, under conditions which tend irre!(i~tibly to their
corrup~ion and ultimnte de~truction. 'J'l1eis phy8ical structure ancl clrnractC'ristics
denote adaptatiou to southern latitudes, and tlwy are mi~placcd when, nll fugitives or emigrauts, tllC'y appear in the north, to unde1·go the competition, contempt and hoFtility of superior laboring populntions, native to the soil or introduced from northern Europe. The E<tructure of society, the climat.c, and the iudustrial pursuits of the north, arc i11imie-al to the wclfnre or even to tlw prolong<>d existence of the negro, and u pou his account our effort11 should be directed to all proper measurC'S for discouraging and 1wevcnti11g his migration
tl1il"her. Any policy which lends to the de~truction of a race crcatecl by the
Almighty must, before any tribunal in which the moral ~ovcmmeut of the world
is recognized, be deRcribccl as O\"il and criminal, and those who 1rnpport it can
only avert just condemnatio~ from themselves by showing that tli<>y act under
the pressure of dire necessity, or arc ignorant of the conticqucnccs of tLcir conduct.
But the policy is bail also with reference to tl1c interl'~ts of oar own rnce. I t
is trnc tl1at a. negro clement of population in any nol'lbern Stnte will die ont
eventually-will be cxtingnisl1ed by the operation of nntural lllws, as certain as
those which regulate the winds of heaven, or the tides of the ocean-unless
accci,~ions continue to be made to it·by immigration. Bnt dming the protracted
p rocess of death, it is a most injurious and pcstilenti11l element to the State.
D <'spised, oppressed, hated; o~traciscd from honorable cmploymeuts; hutted in
the purlieus of citie!' 1111d the outskirts of tow111:1, it contaminates the social and
bur<lcus the political body into wliieh it is intruded, aud by which it is to be
destroyed. And tho corruption it inclncos, tho debasement of social life wMch
comes from it, will extend into the future and be known long aft.er it has itself
di~nppearc,d from the observation of men. It ia, therefore, an object of high
utilit.y to exclude a nC'gro population from our northern States, where it is misplacC'd and injarioa~, and confine it to the southern country, where natural, industrial, and social conditions permit its exi~tcuce.
But the main point, nnd it is the conclusive one, upon which we insist in opposing the 1·cpeal of the fugitive laws, is the right of tl1ose who "hold pci·sons to
serYice and labor under the laws of a State" to require from government the
maiutenance in fall force of such laws ns may be" necc~i.'ary ancl proper" to Yindicnte and enforce tlieir right of reclmnn.tion under the Constitution. 'l'ho,ic only
need take considerations of expediency or of policy into account whose views
of constitutional duty a re unfixed, or formed upon principles of political philosophy which were unknown to, or at least unaccepted by, the illustrious men who
established the government of the United States.
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